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The nation is hardly 'indivisible' where education is concerned. It is at least two
nations, quite methodically divided, with . . . liberty for some . . . and justice . . .
only for the kids whose parents can afford to purchase it.'
INTRODUCTION
Forty-eight years after Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka2 and
twenty-nine years after San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,3
American schools remain racially separate and radically unequal in both
per pupil expenditures and student performance. In spite of efforts to
equalize per pupil spending through state aid formulas, significant dispari-
ties exist within most states and among states.4 Although de jure school
segregation is illegal, de facto racial segregation actually increased during
the 1990s. s In 1998, 70% of African-American children and more than
one third of Latino children attended predominantly minority schools.
6
Our legal regime underlies these shameful inequalities and offers
great promise for remedying them. Plaintiffs in many states have con-
vinced state courts to declare that state legislatures have failed in their
state constitutional obligations to distribute educational resources equally
or to provide meaningfully adequate educational opportunities to all stu-
dents. Sadly, even where legislatures have diligently and swiftly acted to
implement reform efforts, courtroom victories have often not translated
into success in the classroom for children in under-resourced and under-
performing schools.
Applying the lessons of the past five decades of education reform
litigation, this Article seeks to sketch an appropriate judicial role in the
remedial phase of state constitutional litigation. By ensuring the proper
roles for a broad array of local and state actors, courts can create a frame-
work for education reform that maximizes the possibility that successful
litigation efforts will eventually lead to adequate educational opportuni-
ties for all children.
1. JONATHAN KoZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 212
(1991).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that
racial segregation in the Washington, D.C. pubhc schools violated the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment).
3. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that the Texas school financing system, based on local
property taxes, does not violate the U.S. Constitution).
4. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
5. Gary Orfield,The Civil Rights Project, Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of
Resegregation 2 (July, 2001), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.Harvard.edu/research/
deseg/SchoolsMore Separate.pdf (last visited December 4, 2002) [hereinafter Orfield, Schools
More Separate] (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
6. Id. at 32.
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After a brief overview of school finance litigation since Rodriguez
and school desegregation cases since Brown, Part I argues that the "ade-
quacy" model of reform addresses many of the underlying concerns of the
equity model7 without sharing its methodological and strategic shortcom-
ings. Additionally, the adequacy model creates the potential for a much
more dynamic and multifaceted remedial order than courts generally issue
in successful equity suits. Furthermore, this Part contends that courts
should view racial integration as an important component of an adequate
education. School reform must not limit itself to Plessy v. Ferguson's flawed
conception of a racially-divided America.
Part II focuses in more detail on Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State9
("CFE"). On January 9, 2001, a state trial court held that the NewYork
education finance system violated the state constitution and had "an ad-
verse and disparate impact" on minority students in violation of the
implementing regulations'0 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. "
However, the Appellate Division reversed on June 25, 2002 and held that
the state had not failed in its constitutional obligations to NewYork City
schools and that a recent U.S. Supreme Court case had overruled the trial
court on the Title VI claim. The plaintiffs are appealing to the New York
Court of Appeals.
Once a court declares that a school system violates a state constitu-
tion, it faces the difficult task of structuring a remedy. Parts III-VI wade
into the murky area of translating success in the courtroom into success in
the classroom and make a number of recommendations for drafting a re-
medial decree in states like New York, should the Court of Appeals
7. See generally Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: Nev Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 101 (1995) (arguing that "poorer school systems and advo-
cates of expanded educational funding might be better served by leaving equality
arguments behind, in favor of a strategy relying instead on adequacy arguments.")
[ hereinafter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind]; but see Erin E. Buzuvis, "A "for Effort: Evaluat-
ing Recent State Education Reform in Response to Judicial Demands for Equity and Adequacy, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 644, 689 (2001) [hereinafter Buzuvis, "A"for Effort] (arguing that "re-
gardless of the catalyst for reform, education reform can and should include elements of
both equity and adequacy.").
8. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (sustaining a Louisiana law requiring separate but equal ac-
commodations on railroads). "The most common instance of this is connected with the
establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which have been held to
be a valid exercise of legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of
the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced." Id. at 544.
9. 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 2001); 744 N.YS.2d 130 (N.YApp. Div.June 25,
2002). In New York, the Supreme Court is a trial court, the Supreme Court Appellate
Division is the intermediate appellate court, and the highest court is the Court of Appeals.
To avoid confusion, this Article will generally refer to the Supreme Court as the "trial
court" and the Supreme Court Appellate Division as the "Appellate Division."
10. 34 C.ER.§ 100.3 (2002).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2002).
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conclude that a constitutional violation exists 2 On the one hand, unequal
school financing systems represent a failure of majoritarianism and a con-
crete demonstration of the wisdom of the framers' vision of a tripartite
system of government." The judiciary must protect fundamental values
enshrined in constitutional norms, especially when democratic institu-
tions fail to provide them over time. On the other hand, courts are poorly
situated to make budgetary decisions and to determine what reform
measures will work best for individual school districts.
Part III argues that education reform that is implemented after a
finding that a state has violated a state constitutional duty should:
(1) equalize funding to the extent necessary to guarantee certain mini-
mum necessary inputs such as qualified teachers, small class sizes, adequate
physical infrastructure, and other instrumentalities of learning; and (2) take
seriously Brown's proclamation that racial separation is inherently unequal.
Part IV encourages courts to structure education reform remedies
that: (1) envision a firm but limited judicial role to protect the constitu-
tional rights of minorities from majoritarian failures without exceeding
the courts' limited expertise and authority; (2) define adequacy specifically
enough to minimize inter-branch tension and provide political cover for
legislators who must make difficult decisions to implement education
reform; and (3) prioritize collaborative decision-making involving courts,
legislatures, state agencies, local school boards, unions, parents, local busi-
nesses, and civic organizations, partially through a process analogous to
negotiated rulemaking in the administrative law context.
Part V borrows several elements from environmental law and pro-
poses a method for implementing education reform that makes state
legislatures ultimately accountable for educational outcomes. By analogy
to the Clean Air Act, Part V suggests that courts should be goal-setters,
defining the contours of the constitutional requirement-based on inputs
and outcomes-and monitoring the state legislatures' efforts in meeting
these requirements. After a roadmap is crafted and approved, legislatures
should delegate much of the task of implementation to local decision
makers. School districts would be divided into attainment and non-
attainment districts and compliance would be assessed district-by-district
based on whether the measures utilized were realistically calculated to
address the constitutional inadequacy. Legislatures would remain ulti-
mately responsible for fulfilling their constitutional duties-as measured
by inputs and outcomes.
12. See Molly S. McUsic, Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises &
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAw & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOT-
ING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 107 (Jay P Heubert ed., 1999) [hereinafter McUsic, Laws
Role] (arguing that "winning in the courtroom is not the same as winning in the class-
room.").
13. See infra notes 323-27 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Part VI explores some of the daunting challenges faced by
education reform efforts and suggests that rigid ex ante injunctions may
fail to account for the wide range of obstacles faced by school districts.
Flexibility, collaboration, and a holistic approach to education reform may
be necessary to remedy inadequate schools because children attending
under-resourced and under-performing schools confront other daunting
educational impediments besides large class sizes, crumbling school build-
ings, and schools' limited resources to purchase necessary school supplies
and to hire and train teachers. Illiteracy, concentrated poverty, unemploy-
ment, and racial segregation are interrelated cyclical and multigenerational
phenomena.
In America today, 20% of children are born into poverty, 26% per-
cent live with parents who do not have full-time, year-round jobs, and
22% have mothers with less than twelve years of education.14 Children are
less likely to learn to read when the adults in their households cannot
read."5 Education reform must consider the fact that parents are the first
teachers of children in a nation where ninety million adults have limited
literacy skills. 16 In order to make steady progress towards outcome-based
goals, courts may be more successful if they encourage innovation beyond
traditional education finance litigation remedies and allow state legisla-
tures and school districts to consider K-12 education alongside other
efforts including family literacy, early education, and housing policy.
Courts should therefore structure remedies that are flexible enough to
allow state and local actors to consider the unique problems created by
concentrated poverty and other structural obstacles.7
PART I.
The courts have been important battlegrounds in the struggle for
education reform. Employing a range of theories, plaintiffs have
14. See National Institute for Literacy, Fast Facts on Literacy, at http://novel.nifl.gov/
nifl/facts/facts overview.html (last visited March 28, 2002) [hereinafter Fast Facts] (on file
with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
15. Roger G. Schwartz, Comment: Why Johnny' Parents Can't Read ... Or Vote, Or Work,
Or Participate: The National Literacy Crisis and a Proposal to Integrate Illiterate Adults into Main-
stream American Society, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 183, 192 (1997) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Why Johnny's Parents Can't Read].
16. According to the 1992 National Adult Literacy Survey ("NALS"), 40-44 million
adult Americans have the lowest level of prose, document, and qualitative literacy skills
("NALS Level 1"). Some, but not all, of these adults can total an entry on a deposit slip,
locate the time and place of a meeting on a form, and identify specific pieces of informa-
tion in news articles. Approximately 50 million adult Americans performed at a NALS
Level 2; these adults could calculate the cost of a purchase, determine the difference be-
tween two items, locate a particular intersection on a street map, and enter background
information on a simple form. See Fast Facts, supra note 14.
17. See generally infra notes 395-412 and accompanying text.
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challenged state education systems in both state and federal courts on the
basis of racial segregation, funding disparities, and overall inadequacy of
schooling.The results have been mixed.After a landmark success in Brown,
plaintiffs seeking meaningful racial integration struggled to force
compliance with the Supreme Court's ruling ' and have been largely
unsuccessful in arguing that states and localities have an obligation to
remedy defacto rather than dejure segregation. 9 Similarly, plaintiffs arguing
that radical inequalities in per pupil expenditures violated either the
federal or the state constitutions faced a series of legal, theoretical, and
practical obstacles that prevented them from structuring remedial orders
that meaningfully transformed public school systems.2 °
Since 1989, however, a legal theory has emerged that has the poten-
tial to address both the effects of radical funding disparities and potentially
the shameful defacto racial segregation of states' public school systems. By
arguing that state constitutions create an affirmative duty for the legislature
to provide every child with an adequate education, plaintiffs' lawyers have
convinced several state courts that educational systems are constitutionally
inadequate. In practice, even the most dramatic victories under the ade-
quacy theory have not translated immediately into integrated and
adequate schools across the state. However, as a theoretical model, the
adequacy theory holds great potential for overcoming challenges stem-
ming from underfunding, racial segregation, and cyclical poverty.
After a brief overview of the history of education finance litigation
and litigation seeking to force racial integration of schools, this Part argues
that the adequacy theory is conceptually preferable to the equity theory
and that constitutional definitions of adequacy must include an entitle-
ment to meaningful defacto racial integration of schools.
A. Disparities in Funding
States and localities are the primary providers of public education in
the United States. Every state constitution contains an education clause
requiring the state legislature to establish a system of free public schools.2'
18. See infra notes 218-26 and accompanying text.
19. See infia notes 227-36 and accompanying text. But see Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d
1267, 1282-85 (Conn. 1996) (holding that failure to remedy de facto segregation of a
school system violated an affirmative duty under Connecticut's constitution).
20. See infira notes 137-76 and accompanying text.
21. There is some debate over whether Mississippi's constitution requires Mississippi
to establish public schools. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance
Reform Litigation, 28 HAsv. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 311 n.5 (1991) [hereinafter Use of Education
Clauses]. Mississippi's constitution states that "[t]he legislature shall, by general law, provide
for the establishment, maintenance, and support of free public schools upon such condi-
tions and limitations as the Legislature may prescribe." Miss. CONST. art.VIlI, § 201.
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Outside of the areas of special education and bilingual education, states
are responsible for almost all aspects of K-12 public education." The fed-
eral government provides only about 6.8% of funding for public
23education in the United States.
States in turn delegate much of the decision-making authority to lo-
24 2 'Cal school districts. Most states rely primarily on local property taxes as
the main revenue source for funding public schools. 6 Once the property
value is assessed,27 the school board must adopt a budget. The amount to
be raised by local property taxes equals the projected expenditures of the
school district minus contributions from other sources. To get the prop-
erty tax rate to be used to fund local schools, one must divide the amount
to be raised by local property taxes by the assessed valuation of the prop-
erty in the district.2 9 This is sometimes known as the district's
"willingness" or "effort" to support its schools.30 The standard way of
comparing the ability of school districts to raise revenues is to divide the
22. U.S. CONST., amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."); McUsic, Laws Role, supra note 12, at 97 ("Outside the federal requirements
for special education and compensatory aid, the basic legal structure of schooling in the
United States ... is left to the states.").
23. Since compulsory legal education was established in the 1800s, responsibility for
financing and structuring public schools has beef the states' responsibility. See McUsic,
Law's Role, supra note 12, at 93-94. "In the 1998-99 school year, federal funding was a
mere 6.8% of total public secondary school funding." U.S. CENSUS BUaREu, STATISTICAL
TABLES - PUBLIC EIEMENRr -SECONDRY/FINNCES: 1998-99, p.1, table 1, available at
http://www.census.gov/govs/school/99tables.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) [hereinafter
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL TALBES] (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race &
Law).
24. See R. CRAIG WOOD & DAVID C. THOMPSON, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS-AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 11 (2nd ed. 1996)
[hereinafter WOOD & THOMPSON, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE LAW]. Hawaii is the only state
that does not have geographically-delineated school districts as a basis for raising funds.
Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's All Just a Change in Attitudes, 34 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. RtEv. 547,551 n.20 (1999) [hereinafter Patt, School Finance Battles].
25. For a discussion of property taxes, see generally WALTER I. GARMs,J.W GUTHRIE, &
L.C. PIERCE, SCHOOL FINANCE: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OP PUBLIC EDUCATION 132-
48 (1978).
26. MARK G.YUDOF Er AL., EDUCATION POLICY & THE LAW 768 (4th ed. 2002) [here-
inafter Yudof, EDUCATION POLICY & THE LAW IV]. Hawaii and Michigan are two
exceptions. See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, & the "Third
Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMPLE L. R-Ev. 1151, 1151 n.6 (1995) [hereinafter
Heise, State Constitutions].
27. Assessment of property values poses difficult technical and political problems.
MARK G.YuooF Er AL., EDUCATION POLICY & THE LAW 592-94 (3d ed. 1992). It is often
difficult to assess the value of different types of property. Politically, there is significant pres-
sure to keep assessed values down. Id. at 592.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 593.
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total value of the district's assessed property by the number of pupils in
the district.3 The amount of revenue per pupil can be determined by
multiplying the district's "effort" by its assessed valuation per pupil.3
Variations in per pupil taxable property base from one district to the
next often lead to large per pupil spending inequalities.33 For example, dis-
parities in assessed valuation per pupil between the wealthiest and the
poorest districts in Arizona are greater than 7,000 to 1. 34 No state draws the
boundaries of its districts to equalize the value of the property base from
which these taxes are raised. 3' Districts are therefore able to raise differing
amounts of money for their schools. 3' Even at high tax rates, districts with
low property values cannot adequately fund their schools, whereas wealthy
37districts can raise large amounts of funding even at lower tax rates.
In addition to disparities in property wealth per pupil, inter-district
disparities also result from differences in tax rates and property assessment
practices.3 8 For example, a high ratio of land value to school-aged children
can be maintained through exclusionary zoning and other tactics. 39 As
Professor Molly McUsic explains, "[p]roviding public education through a
geographically based structure ... means that the inequities in residential
housing are reflected in schools., 40 Other factors, such as inflation, ex-
panding enrollments, new state and federal mandates, and higher
31. Id. at 592-93.
32. Id. at 593.
33. Id.
34. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P2d 806, 809 (Ariz. 1994).
35. McUsic, Law's Role, supra note 12, at 98.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Erin E. Kelly, Note: All Students Are Not Created Equal: the Inequitable
Combination of Property- Tax-Based School Finance Systems and Local Control, 45 DuKE LJ.
397, 397 (1995) [hereinafter Kelly, All Students Are Not Created Equal] (explaining that
"[w]ealthy school districts raise a large amount of money from low tax rates, whereas poor
school districts levy a much higher tax rate but generate less revenue.Thus, these school
finance schemes enable wealthy students to attain educational luxuries while poor districts
lack basic necessities.") (citations omitted).
38. Yudof, EDUCATION POLICY & THE LAW III, supra note 27, at 593.
39. McUsic, Laws Role, supra note 12, at 98.
40. Id.; cf DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGA-
TION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 83 (1993) [hereinafter MASSEY & DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID] (explaining that "[t]he spatial isolation of black Americans was
achieved by a conjunction of racist attitudes, private behaviors, and institutional practices
that disenfranchised blacks from urban housing markets and led to the creation of the
ghetto. Discrimination in employment exacerbated black poverty and limited the eco-
nomic potential for integration, and black residential mobility was systematically blocked
by pervasive discrimination and White avoidance of neighborhoods containing blacks.")
(citations omitted).
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spending by rich districts also exacerbate the difference between rich and
poor school districts.
41
All state governments attempt to address funding disparities through
supplemental appropriations to local school districts.42 In no state does the
supplemental funding actually eliminate funding disparities.43 Although
the ratio of local to state contribution varies greatly between states, 44 the
reliance on local property tax seems to be rising relative to the state con-
tribution.
Despite efforts to equalize funding disparities through state aid for-
mulas, significant disparities exist in most states. Per pupil expenditures in
46Texas range from $2,112 to $19,333. SomeVermont schools spend 160%
of what others spend.47 Public schools on Long Island spend almost twice
as much per pupil as schools in New York City, despite much lower48
costs. In addition to these intrastate disparities, interstate disparities are
also stark. 49 For example, New Jersey spends on average $10,230 per pupil
each year, whereas the average in Utah is just $4,169.50 Of course, differ-
ences in expenses from one location to the next limit the usefulness of
direct comparisons of per pupil expenditures. However, the mere scope of
the disparities has played an important role in litigation and reform ef-
forts.
The federal government, through Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act,"1 provides grants for educational and secondary
school programs for children of low-income families. However, the dollar
amounts are low relative to the overall costs of public education and fund-
ing tends to be equal across states and districts rather than equalizing. 2
41. Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS. 499, 499 (1991).
42. No state relies exclusively on local property taxes to fund its schools. Patt, School
Finance Battles, supra note 24, at 551.
43. McUsic, Law's Role, supra note 12, at 99.
44. Yudof, EDUCATION POLICY & THE LAW III, supra note 27, at 592.
45. Id.
46. See McUsic, Law's Role, supra note 12, at 89.
47. Id. at 88.
48. See Campaign for Fiscal Equality, The State of Learning: a Report from the Regents &
State Education Department to the Governor & the Legislature (June, 2001) cited at
www.cfequity.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
49. This Article will focus on intrastate disparities, segregation, and remedies rather
than interstate issues. Also beyond the scope of this Article are: (1) questions regarding the
advisability of alternative proposals for reforming public education, such as vouchers, char-
ter schools, and tuition tax credits; and (2) the question of whether the American public
school system, as a whole, is "failing."
50. See U.S. CENSUS BUmRU, STATISTICAL TABLES, supra note 23, p. 10, table 8.
51. 20 U.S.C. 55 6301-8962 (1994).
52. See McUsic, Laws Role, supra note 12, at 94 (explaining that 90% of school dis-
tricts received funding in 1993).
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Critics have suggested that Title I's complicated funding scheme some-
times gives less funding to the neediest schools than other schools receive,
though revisions in 1994 have mitigated this concern somewhat. 3
In important ways, federal law may actually exacerbate funding dis-
parities. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 4 and the Equal Education
Opportunities Act5's require that local schools provide certain services for
bilingual education students. Similarly, the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA") 6 requires that local schools provide students
with a free, appropriate public education ("FAPE"). Although Congress
provides some money for these purposes, the federal funding appropriated
is not sufficient to provide the services Congress demands. 7 Thus, it is an
unfunded mandate 58-local school systems must make up the difference.
As an empirical matter, special education students and bilingual edu-
cation students are disproportionately located in poor neighborhoods.5 '
Thus, these unfunded mandates affect poor schools more than rich
schools. 60 Even if the state funding formulas provided precisely equal
funding for students across school districts, the spending levels for non-
special education students in poor districts would be lower than the
spending levels for non-special education students in rich districts.
61
There is vigorous debate about the effect of educational spending on
educational opportunity. Some scholars, such as Professors James Coleman
and Eric Hanushek, contend that money has little effect.6' In contrast,
Professor Ronald Ferguson argues that after controlling for a number of
family and community background factors, more literate teachers, fewer
large classes, and more experienced teachers predict better test scores
53. See id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2002).
55. 20 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. (1994).
56. 20 U.S.C. 1400-1490 (1994).
57. McUsic, Laws Role, supra note 12, at 96-97.
58. Id. at 96.
59. See Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary J. Bane, Ghetto Poverty in the United States, 1970-
1980 in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 235-53 (Christopher Jencks & Paul Peterson eds., 1991)
[hereinafter Jargowsky & Bane, Ghetto Poverty].
60. McUsic, Laws Role, supra note 12, at 97.
61. Id. at 96 (arguing that the IDEA "practically assures that a nonspecial education
student in a state with a high population of special education students will have more
education funding diverted from his or her instruction than will a nonspecial education
student in a state with a low population of special education students").
62. See, e.g. ,JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966)
(arguing that school resources have minimal effect on student achievement); Eric A. Ha-
nushek, When School Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423,
425 (1991) (arguing that "[t]here is no systematic relationship between school expenditures and
student performance") (emphasis in original).
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among students.63 Professor Ferguson further contends that equal salaries
will not attract equally qualified teachers to dissimilar districts and that
states should pay higher salaries to attract a proportionate share of the best
teachers to poorer districts.64
To the extent that disparities in funding levels are reflected in other
factors, such as "class size, teacher salaries, libraries, sports equipment,
and guidance counseling" , inadequate funding causes serious problems
for poor schools. Additionally, some school districts cannot even afford
66structurally safe buildings. Common sense suggests that money is not
67
irrelevant to educational opportunity. As one scholar has argued, "one
cannot reasonably believe that children in poor districts have the same
educational opportunities as children in rich districts. 6 8 African-
American and Latino children are much more likely to drop out of high
69 cideschool than White children. Poor children do not read as well as
wealthy children.
B. From Equity to Adequacy
In light of these disturbing disparities in resources and outcomes,
many education reform advocates have sought to force changes in the
school financing system through the court system. Roughly speaking,
litigators have challenged systems of school finance from two perspec-
tives: "equity" and "adequacy." Historically, equity claims predominated
at the federal and state levels in the 1970s and 1980s, and adequacy
claims have emerged as the dominant litigation and reform strategy over
the last thirteen years. Following William Thro, this Article divides the
last twenty-nine years of school finance reform cases into three waves.7'
63. Ronald F Ferguson, Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on How and Why
Money Matters, 28 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 465,488 (1991) [hereinafter Ferguson, Paying for Public
Education].
64. Id. at 489.
65. Julie Zwibelman, Note, Broadening the Scope of School Finance and Resource Compa-
rability Litigation, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 527, 528 (2001) [hereinafter Zwibelman,
Broadening the Scope].
66. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733,762-68 (Ohio 1997).
67. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 525 (holding that "increased educa-
tional resources, if properly deployed, can have a significant and lasting effect on student
performance").
68. Patt, School Finance Battles, supra note 24, at 552 n.31.
69. McUsic, Law's Role, supra note 12, at 89.
70. Id.
71. William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas
Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219
(1990); see also Thro,Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation:The
Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REv. 597 (1994) [hereinafter Thro,Judicial
Analysis].
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To oversimplify somewhat, 2 the first two waves focused on "equity" and
the current, third wave focuses on "adequacy."
The first wave was based on the federal equal protection clause13 and
is exemplified by Serrano v. Priest74 and Rodriguez." The basic argument was
that the federal constitution guaranteed that all children would have the
same amount of money spent on their education or at least that children
were entitled to equal educational opportunities. The second wave took
place exclusively at the state level,7 but retained the basic contours of the
equal protection (or "equity") model 8 The third wave is still taking place
at the state level and focuses on claims of adequacy.79 Plaintiffs within the
third wave make the argument that all children are entitled to a certain
quality of education and that more money is often necessary to bring un-
der-performing school districts up to the minimum level mandated by
the state education clause.8° Additionally, third wave cases focus more on
the state education clauses than on equal protection clauses"' and insist on
sweeping reforms accompanied by continued court supervision.
8
2
When a school system is challenged on adequacy grounds, litigators
focus on ensuring that every school district provides a certain quality of
education, regardless of the resources expended to achieve that quality. If
all of the schools in a state are inadequate, the court's decision will de-
mand that all schools be elevated to a state-prescribed minimum adequacy
level.83 If only a part of the system is inadequate, or if certain groups are
not meeting state performance goals, an adequacy-based reform measure
will require the state to provide the requisite quality of education to that
group.
72. See infra note 118.
73. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV ("[N]or [shall any state] deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
74. 487 P2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971).
75. ThroJudicial Analysis, supra note 71, at 600; see infra notes 100-13 and accompany-
ing text.
76. Id. at 600-601.
77. For an analysis of the differences between state constitutions and the federal con-
stitution, see generally Robert F Utter, Freedom & Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on
State Constitutions & the Washington Declaration of Rights, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 239,241-42 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1984).
78. ThroJudicial Analysis, supra note 71, at 601-602. See generally infa notes 115-76
and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 177-201 and accompanying text.
80. ThroJudicialAnalysis, supra note 71, at 603.
81. Id. at 603-04; but see Buzuvis, "A"for Effort, supra note 7, at 689 (arguing that "re-
gardless of the catalyst for reform, education reform can and should include elements of
both equity and adequacy.").
82. ThroJudicialAnalysis, supra note 71, at 604.
83. See Buzuvis, "A"for Effort, supra note 7, at 669.
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This Article argues that the adequacy theory addresses the core con-
cern of equity cases without falling prey to its methodological and
theoretical shortcomings. Instead of focusing on per pupil expenditures as
an imperfect proxy for educational opportunity, an adequacy theory sug-
gests that the state's real duty should be to provide a certain level of
educational quality to each child, regardless of her economic or geo-
graphic circumstances. In the remedies phase, an adequacy theory permits
courts to structure a framework that addresses the myriad components of
a quality education rather than confining it to the narrower and less
promising task of equalizing a finite set of inputs. Furthermore, while the
shift from equity to adequacy does not obviate plaintiffs' need to argue
that more money may be required to address specific deficiencies in a
state educational system, it does mitigate the concern that a state's duty to
provide a public education to all students will be measured by how many
dollars are spent on each child.
1.The First Wave: Federal "Equity" Claims
Until 1973, plaintiffs' attorneys hoped to reform school finance
structures through federal litigation. In Mclnnis v. Shapiro,84 Illinois students
alleged that a state financing scheme violated the equal protection 8' and
86due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because they permit-
ted wide variations in per pupil expenditures from district to district,
resulting in some students being deprived of a good education.7 A federal
district court in Illinois found that the claim was not justiciable because
there were no discoverable and manageable standards to determine when
the constitution is satisfied. 8 Likewise, in Burruss v. Wilkerson," a federal
district court inVirginia relied on Mclnnis when it urged the plaintiffs to
84. 293 E Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
85. See supra note 73.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 1 ("[Njor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
87. Professor Yudof argues that the reasons plaintiffs advanced for the
unconstitutionality of the differences were different and conflicting because plaintiffs
argued on the one hand that only a financing scheme that apportions funds according to
the needs of the students would satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other hand,
plaintiffs argued that a system that allocated funds on the basis of flat dollar equality or
assured that equal tax rates led to equal spending would be constitutionally permissible. See
YUDOF, ET AL., EDUCATION POLICY & THE LAW IV supra note 26, at 776.
88. 293 F Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Ill. 1968) aff'd, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). The court also
declined to strike down the funding scheme because the state's action was rational in light
of its interest in local control; allocation of public revenues was a legislative issue rather
than a judicial issue; and the United States Constitution did not require allocation on the
basis of need or equal dollars per pupil. Id. at 336-37.
89. 310 E Supp. 572 (WD.Va. 1969).
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seek relief from the legislature. ° As one scholar remarked "[n]either suit
was successful because the courts, having construed the plaintiffs' claims as
seeking a system which provided resources on the basis of educational
'need" felt there were no manageable standards for a court to determine
such 'need"''91
After these initial failures, plaintiffs' attorneys began to rely on a sim-
pler theory based on the scholarship of Professor John Coons.9 2 The idea
was to sever the link between per capita expenditures and district prop-
erty wealth9 3 The plaintiffs' theory was based on a "principle of fiscal
neutrality" 9 -essentially that the quality of public education may not be a
function of wealth other than the wealth of an entire state. Professor
Coons' theory played a major role in the plaintiffs' victory in Serrano v.
Priest 1,9' in which the California Supreme Court accepted the principle
of fiscal neutrality and held that the state education finance system vio-
lated both the state constitution 96 and the federal constitution. 97 Serrano I
quickly led to the first wave of school finance litigation. Suits were filed
in more than two thirds of the states.99
The first wave ended abruptly when a divided Supreme Court de-
cided San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.'°° In Rodriguez, a
group of parents brought suit against Texas on behalf of poor and
Mexican-American students who resided in school districts with low
90. Id. at 574.
91. Betsy Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation:A Commentary, 1977
DuKE L.J. 1099, 1101 (1977) [ hereinafter Levin, Current Trends].
92. See J. COONS, W CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH & PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1970).
93. Levin, Current Trends, supra note 91, at 1101.
94. Although districts would not be required to choose the same tax rates, equal tax
rates would achieve equal results. The goal was not to eliminate inequalities, but rather to
sever the correlation between per pupil district property wealth and per pupil spending
without undermining local control. See YUDOF, Er AL., EDUCATION POLICY & THE LAW II,
at 776. Cf Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that a state must provide indigent
criminal defendants appealing convictions with a free trial transcript); Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that a state must provide indigent criminal defendants
appealing convictions with a free attorney).
95. 487 P2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971).
96. The California constitution provides that "All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation." CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 16.
97. The Serrano I court relied heavily on federal equal protection analysis, finding that
the school finance system affected a suspect class of citizens and burdened a fundamental
right.The California Supreme Court found that the school finance system could not sur-
vive strict scrutiny. Serrano 1, 487 P2d 1241, 1250-62 (Cal. 1971).
98. Thro,JudicialAnalysis, supra note 71,at 601 n.22.
99. Levin, Current Trends, supra note 91, at 1101.
100. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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property tax bases.'0 ' The plaintiffs brought suit under the federal equal
protection clause. 0 2 Based largely on substantial inter-district disparities in
school expenditures, 0 3 a federal district court10 4 ruled that the Texas school
finance system violated the federal equal protection clause because:
(1) education was a fundamental interest; and (2) poverty was a "suspect
classification.' ' 0
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court ruled that poverty was
not a suspect classification 6 and that the equal protection clause did not
require absolute equality of educational expenditures.'0 7 The Supreme
Court also rejected the district court's finding that education was a fun-
damental right.0 8
If the plaintiffs had succeeded on either claim, the Court would have
applied strict scrutiny to Texas' education finance system,'0 9 and it is likely
that the plaintiffs would have succeeded in establishing a constitutional
violation. Since the plaintiffs failed on both claims, however, the Supreme
Court required only that the state's system bear a rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose. The Supreme Court held that the Texas school
financing system survived rational basis review."' The majority expressed
concern about a slippery slope. If the Court created an entitlement to
education-which is not explicitly mentioned in the federal constitu-
tion-there would be no principled way to differentiate education from
101. Id. at 4-5.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F Supp. 280,282 (WD.Tex. 1971).
104. 337 F Supp. 280 (WD.Tex. 1971).
105. 411 U.S. at 16. For an overview of suspect classifications and forbidden
discrimination, see generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 628-647 (14th ed. 2001) [hereinafter SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
For an overview of fundamental interests in the equal protection context, see generally id. at
794-862.
106. Cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that racial classifica-
tions should be held to the "most rigid scrutiny" but finding that internment of United
States citizens survived that scrutiny because of "pressing public necessity.").
107. 411 U.S. at 18 (holding that "... we find neither the suspect-classification nor the
fundamental interest analysis persuasive."); see also 411 U.S. at 25 ("For these two reasons-
the absence of any evidence that the financing system discriminates against any definable
category of'poor' people or that it results in the absolute deprivation of education-the
disadvantaged class is not susceptible of identification in traditional terms").
108. Compare 337 F Supp. at 282 with 411 U.S. 1 at 14-15. Brown referred to education
as "perhaps the most important function of state and local governments" but did not use
the term "fundamental right." 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
109. Cf 337 F Supp. at 282-84.
110. 411U.S.at4O.
111. Id. at 54-55. In contrast, the district court had ruled that the defendants had failed
to state even a reasonable basis for the classifications. See 337 E Supp. at 284.
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other potentially "fundamental" interests such as food and shelter.'1 2 The
Court was also reluctant to diminish local control over taxing and spend-
ing decisions."
3
2.The Second Wave: State "Equity" Claims
Since Rodriguez, the battleground of education finance reform has
shifted to the states." 4 Rodriguez itself ironically opened the door to a sec-
ond wave of litigation under state constitutions. Rodriguez stressed that
"education ... is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under
our Federal Constitution""5 Plaintiffs seized on this language to suggest
that "since education was explicitly mentioned in the state constitutions,
[education] was a fundamental right for state equal protection pur-
poses.' ,11 6 Less than two weeks after Rodriguez was decided, the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled in Robinson v. Cahill' 7 that the New Jersey educa-
tion finance system violated its state constitution."
8
The second wave began in 1973 and ran until 1989." 9 During sec-
ond wave, plaintiffs asserted the same basic arguments they had used in
112. See 411 U.S. at 37 (explaining that "the logical limitations on appellees' nexus
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from the
significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter.").
113. 411 U.S. at 49-50. Cf infra note 418 (discussing the advantages of retaining sig-
nificant dependence on local property taxes to fund schools).
114. See Thro,JudicialAnalysis, supra note 71, at 600-02. Some scholars have contended
that school reform efforts based on the federal constitution are still possible after Rodriguez.
See Julius Chambers, Adequate Education for All:A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22 HtAv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 55, 68 - 72 (1987). Rodriguez suggested in dicta that the Constitution might
guarantee "some identifiable quantum of education" as a means to the exercise of free
expression or other fundamental rights. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973). No effort so far
has been successful. McUsic, Laws Role, supra note 12, at 103. However, Justice White
suggested in Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986), that the issue was not fully resolved,
explaining that "[a]s Rodriguez and Plyler indicate, this Court has not yet definitively
decided whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a
statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened equal
protection review." Id. at 285. Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens joined in that part of the opinion.
115. 411U.S. at 35.
116. Patt, School Finance Battles, supra note 24, at 559.
117. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
118. Thro argues that Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (NJ. 1973), is the quintessential
phase two case. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 71, at 601. Ironically, though the New
Jersey Supreme Court used an equality rationale to strike down the state's financing
scheme, it declined to rest its decision on the state equal protection clause, holding instead
that the school finance system failed to meet the state constitution's thorough and efficient
requirement. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295.
119. Thro,JudicialAnalysis, supra note 71, at 601.
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Rodriguez under state constitutions.'2 0 Although plaintiffs sometimes
brought suit under both state equal protection clauses and state education
clauses,' 2' the basic claim was that students were entitled to substantial
educational equality In addition to the standard equal protection analy-
sis, 122 plaintiffs often argued that the education clauses themselves
demanded equality of funding 23 because of terms like "general,' 21 "uni-
form , "21 "system ,
" 26 and "effi cient '127
Plaintiffs based their equal protection arguments either on the idea
that public school education constitutes a fundamental right or that dis-
trict wealth constitutes a suspect classification.' 2 Alternatively, plaintiffs
argued that neither an interest in local control nor any other interest con-
stituted a rational basis for a property wealth based system.1
2 9
In these cases, state Supreme Courts generally utilized an analytical
scheme similar to the one used in federal equal protection cases." 3 Where
racial classifications were used or where poverty was treated as a suspect
classification, strict scrutiny applied and the state generally lost. Where
education was treated as a fundamental right,'3' strict scrutiny applied and
the state generally lost.Where no fundamental interests or suspect classifi-
cations were implicated, the state merely had to demonstrate that the
policy was rationally related to a legitimate state objective.' 32 The asserted
interest was generally local control1 33 and the states usually won (but not
120. Id.
121. Unlike the federal constitution, every state-except, arguably, Mississippi-has an
education clause. Use of Education Clauses, supra note 21, at 311 n.5. One advantage to
combining state equal protection claims with references to state education clauses is that
such litigation has fewer implications for other areas of law than a straight equal protection
analysis, thus avoiding the slippery slope problem that troubled the Rodriguez court. See
Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 26, at 1159.
122. States are not required to adopt federal equal protection doctrine when interpret-
ing analogous state clauses, but it is common practice to do so. McUsic, Law's Role, supra
note 12, at 103.
123. Patt, School Finance Battles, supra note 24, at 559.
124. See, e.g., Dupree v.Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W2d 90,91 (Ark. 1983).
125. See, e.g., Olsen v. State, 554 P2d 139, 148 (Or. 1976).
126. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359,368-69 (N.Y 1982).
127. See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty Bd. Of Educ., 458 A.2d 758,764 (Md. 1983).
128. Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind, supra note 7, at 106-7.
129. Id. at 107.
130. McUsic, Law's Role, supra note 12, at 103.
131. California, Connecticut, West Virginia, Wyoming decided that education was a
fundamental right for equal protection purposes in part because of the inclusion of educa-
tion clauses in the state constitutions. McUsic, Law' Role, supra note 12. at 144-45 n.93.
132. The school financing schemes in Tennessee and Arkansas failed rational basis re-
view because the courts held the state's interest in local control was not even rationally
related to the financing scheme.Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W2d 139
(Tenn. 1993); Dupree v.Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
133. McUsic, Lawl Role, supra note 12, at 103.
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always).134 Under this constellation of theories, plaintiffs prevailed about
half the time 3" but with decreasing success over time.'
36
The equality regime was flawed on a number of levels. Professor
Enrich argues that equalization threatens to demand too much and to
overwhelm other important concerns. 37 Defendants fought equalization
schemes in part because of their zero sum aspects-more money for poor
schools often meant less money for rich schools or higher taxes in rich
communities.""' Even equity's non-zero sum aspects are threatening to
parents in wealthy school districts.To the extent that unequal schools give
wealthy children a higher likelihood of access to exclusive colleges and
concomitant post-graduate economic opportunities, the wealthy have a
vested stake in not merely their schools' excellence, but also their superi-
ority.1
39
Another problem is definitional. Equality has enormous appeal as a
rhetorical concept, but its actual meaning is murky in the educational
context. 14 The equity of a school finance system can be measured in at
least three ways: (1) horizontal equity; (2) vertical equity; and (3) fiscal
neutrality.14' Horizontal equity involves a comparison of the per pupil
expenditures of the wealthiest districts with the poorest districts. Re-
form efforts that focus on horizontal equity aim to narrow revenue gaps
to eliminate wealth-based allocations of benefits.13 Vertical equity analysis
considers the costs associated with educating various kinds of students (for
example, special education students, bilingual education students, and
gifted students).4  Fiscal neutrality seeks to equalize tax efforts and bur-
dens across school districts.'
4
A central question is how to determine what should be equalized.
Possibilities include: (1) disparities in capacity to fund education;'
46
(2) disparities in actual funding provided for schools;'4 7 (3) disparities in
134. See supra note 132.
135. See Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 26, at 1159.
136. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
137. See Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind, supra note 7, at 144-45.
138. Id. at 156.
139. Id. at 158.
140. Id. at 144.





146. See Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind, supra note 7, at 145.
147. See id. at 147.
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caliber of educational services (i.e., inputs);"" or (4) disparities in out-
comes.' 49 If the legislature's goal is to advance equity (however defined),
there are at least four strategies it can pursue: (1) implementing a founda-
tion program"s to ensure minimum per student expenditures ("leveling
up");' (2) spending caps1s2 and recapture provisions'" that limit the
spending of the richest districts ("leveling down"); 15 4 consolidating tax
bases and school districts;' and (4) a variety of other strategies to equal-
ize tax bases.
15 6
In practice, whatever equalization definition or strategy is adopted,
the equity scheme achieved through education finance litigation does not
actually eliminate funding disparities. 7 Equality-based reform often fails
to account for differences in the costs of teaching poorer children that are
associated with higher teaching costs, security costs, repairs, health
148. See id. at 149; see also id. at 150 (arguing that "even identical services and facilities
will not afford an equal educational opportunity to students who come to school with
sharply different needs and abilities.").
149. See id. at 151 n.253 (noting that some scholars have referred to output measure-
ment as "true equity" rather than "mere equality."). Efforts to equalize inputs and
outcomes rather than funding or capacity to fund have been portrayed in some contexts as
"equality" concepts. See id. at 148-51. However, they also blur into the definition of ade-
quacy.The CFE opinion, discussed infra notes 259-87 and accompanying text, is generally
seen as an "adequacy" suit, but the trial court's opinion relies in part on the idea that in-
puts and outputs need to be substantially equalized in order to meet the constitutional
requirement of a sound, basic education.
150. A foundation program is based on the school district's ability to pay for a mini-
mum education program.The state funds the difference between a legislatively determined
local share and the cost of a minimum program. School districts may exceed the minimum
standards. See generally WOOD & THOMPSON, EDUCATION FINANCE LAW, supra note 24, at 25-
28.
151. Buzuvis, "A"for Effort, supra note 7, at 664-65.True "leveling up"-in the sense of
bringing every district up to the spending levels of the highest spending districts-might
be prohibitively expensive. For example, the Texas Supreme Court predicted that bringing
all districts up to the level of the highest spending districts would cost approximately four
times the annual cost of running the entire state government. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Kirby, 804 S.W2d 491,495-96 (Tex. 1991) (Edgewood 1I).
152. Buzuvis, "A"for Effort, supra note 7, at 665-66.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 665-67. In "penny pool plans," school districts can set any tax rate they
want; but excess funds above a state-set minimum are redistributed across the state accord-
ing to the tax effort of the district. Patt, School Finance Battles, supra note 24, at 552. A
variation on this plan is called a "floating cork plan" where districts can avoid redistribu-
tion if they have revenue above a set amount. Id. at 552 n.27.
155. Buzuvis, "A "for Effort, supra note 7, at 667-68.
156. See generally id. at 668-69 (describing equity remedies contained in the Texas
plan). For example, "funding equalization plans" attempt to guarantee the same level of
funding for the same rate of taxation. See Patt, School Finance Battles, supra note 24, at 551-
52.
157. McUsic, Laws Role, supra note 12, at 99.
FALL 20021
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
problems, disabilities, hunger, family disruption, and violence.1 8 Unfunded
federal mandates also have a disparate effect on students in poor districts
who do not need special education or bilingual education services." 159
Legislatures have had a very difficult time implementing "equity" in
a way that actually improves educational opportunity for students in un-
der-performing schools. Even truly equal funding will often fail to
provide equal opportunities.16 0 Increases in funding may not immediately
overcome the cumulative effect of years of inadequate education. 6 Addi-
tionally, as discussed infra Part VI,16' "[t]he effects of racial and
socioeconomic isolation ... cannot be adequately addressed by school
finance reform, because students in schools with high concentrations of
poverty need more than increased funding to improve their achieve-
ment.''163 Equality-based theories may fail to distinguish school finance
164
from other important variables that influence educational opportunity.
As Professor Enrich explains:
In short, equalization of outcomes, or even of actual services,
has proven too ambitious a standard in the political process.
And yet, mere equalization of tax capacity, or even the sig-
nificant progress some states have achieved towards
equalization of school budgets, has proven insufficient to put
the educational opportunities of disadvantaged children on a
165par with those of their better-off peers.
Another major problem is that equality-based reform sometimes
leads to a leveling down of expenditures. It is possible to create equal
situations that are inadequate; this is essentially what happened in Califor-
nia after plaintiffs won a huge victory in Serrano v. Priest.166 California's per
158. See id. at 106; James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, & Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 256-57
(1999) [hereinafter Ryan, Schools, Race, & Money] (explaining that "[b]ecause poor students
typically have greater needs, schools composed of poor students are costlier to run than
schools composed of middle- and upper-income students"); see also Canpaign for Fiscal
Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 547 (rejecting the state's argument that its state aid formula suffi-
ciently accounts for differences in student need).
159. See generally supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
160. See McUsic, Law's Role, supra note 12, at 106 (arguing that "[equal funding of
unequal needs is not true equality.").
161. See Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope, supra note 65, at 530.
162. See infra notes 383-99 and accompanying text.
163. See Ryan, Schools, Race, & Money, supra note 158, at 256.
164. See Heise, State Constitutions, supra note 26, at 1162; see also infra PartVI.
165. Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind, supra note 7, at 154.
166. 557 P2d 929 (Cal. 1977). See YUDOF, ET AL., EDUCATION POLICY & THE LAW IV,
supra note 26, at 774.
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pupil expenditures were near the national average in 1976-77, but only
thirty-eighth in 1999-2000.1
67
Finally, after some initial successes, equity was not a particularly suc-
cessful strategy for plaintiffs, especially in the 1980s. From 1980 on,
plaintiffs using equity-based strategies lost in Georgia,
68 New York,' 69
Colorado, Maryland, Oklahoma, 72 North Carolina,17 and South
Carolina'74 and were only successful inWyoming and Arkansas.6
3. The Third Wave: State "Adequacy" Suits
Many of the methodological and practical shortcomings of the eq-
uity theory can be overcome through the use of an adequacy theory.
Adequacy emerged as the dominant theory utilized by plaintiffs during
the third wave of education finance reform which began in the late 1980s
with plaintiffs' victories in Montana, Kentucky, and Texas. 177 Third wave
plaintiffs emphasize adequacy of educational opportunity rather than
equality of educational expenditures. 7 They allege that state constitutions
prohibit disparities in the quality of education from one district to an-
other regardless of funding levels. Rather than relying primarily on state
equal protection clauses, the plaintiffs focus on state education clauses.'
79
At least in theory, this eliminates the slippery slope problem inherent in
the earlier equal protection claims because there is little danger of spill-
over into other areas of government services. 180 According to Professor
Thro, state courts responded to this shift in strategy by imposing more
aggressive judicial remedies where constitutional violations were demon-
strated.18'
167. See Education Data Partnership, California's Rankings, 1999-2000, at http://
www.ed-data.k12.ca.us/calrankings.asp (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) (on file with the
Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
168. McDaniel v.Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981).
169. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y 1982).
170. Lujan v. Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
171. Hornbeck v. Board of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983).
172. Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987).
173. Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct.App. 1987).
174. Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988).
175. Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
176. Dupree v.Alma Sch. Dist. No., 651 S.W2d 90 (Ark. 1983).
177. Thro,JudicialAnalysis, supra note 71, at 603.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id.; but see Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind, supra note 7, at 16-62 (noting that
in spite of this limitation, the slippery slope issue has recurred in state constitutional cases).
181. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 71, at 604. But see Patt, School Finance Battles,
supra note 24, at 572-74 (arguing that increased plaintiff successes of the third wave are not
the result of a shift away from equal protection claims towards adequacy claims, but rather
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Adequacy plaintiffs contend that students are constitutionally entitled
to a minimum quality of education.The dispute becomes one about what
level of quality is required and what resources are necessary to acquire it.
Rather than demanding that every child receive the same dollar amount
of educational expenditures, adequacy plaintiffs contend that a certain
amount of money may be required to bring the lowest-performing school
districts up to the minimum level of quality. Theoretically, then, a school
that spent very little money but provided an adequate education would
not give rise to a claim (even if other districts spent much more), but a
poorly performing school district might give rise to a claim, even if its per
pupil expenditures were high.
In determining the level of the state's obligation, it may matter how
the state's education clause is phrased. Some state constitutions create an
entitlement only to free public schools, while others demand a certain
level of quality. Gershon Ratner has divided the state education clauses
into four categories, 82 in ascending order of constitutional obligation:
(1) committing states to educating their children in very general language;
(2) imposing greater obligations by emphasizing the quality of education
that must be provided; (3) adding language and preambles to strengthen
the legislative duty; and (4) granting the highest level of educational op-
portunity, including specific duties and using terms like "the paramount
duty of the state., 83 There is some debate over whether in practice there is
a positive correlation between stronger constitutional language and plain-
184
tiff victories in school finance litigation suits.
can be explained by political developments in individual states and evolving attitudes to-
wards education).
182. Erica Black Grubb was the first to develop this classification system in an article
regarding bilingual education; Ratner adapted it to fit the state education clauses. See Erica
Black Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARv. CR.-
C.L. L.R.Ev. 52, 66-70 (1974); Gershon Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools:
Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. REv. 777, 815-816 (1985) [hereinafter Ratner,
New Legal Duty].
183. See Ramer, New Legal Duty, supra note 182, at 815-16; but see Use of Education
Clauses, supra note 21, at 309 n.4 (arguing that Ratner and others failed to distinguish
between education clauses that invite equity claims and those that invite minimum stan-
dards claims).
184. Compare Paula J. Lundberg, State Courts & School Funding:A Fifty-State Analysis, 63
ALB. L. PEv. 1101, 1108 & 1145 (2000) (using Ratner's categories and arguing that where
state constitutions contained specific language regarding the legislative duty to support
education, plaintiffs were more likely to be successful in convincing state courts that the
education finance system is unconstitutional), with Patt, School Finance Battles, supra note 24,
at 555 (arguing that the strength of education clauses has little determinative effect on the
plaintiffs' rates of success). Cf Thro,.Judicial Analysis, supra note 71, at 611 (arguing that the
weak language of the Tennessee and Massachusetts clauses fail to explain the strong quality
standard imposed by the court).
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Building from the language of the education clause, judicial prece-
dent, and other factors, courts must determine what quality standard the
state constitution requires. Professor Thro has argued that the outcome of
third wave cases is largely determined by the quality standard that the
court sets. Where the required quality standard is high, the system fails and
where it is low, the system passes."' Professor Thro argues that courts do
not use principled criteria for determining the quality standard, but rather
impose the value judgment of a majority of their members.' 6
Many of the most progressive third wave courts follow the lead set
by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better Education.
1 87
The Rose court held that education was a fundamental right'88 and that
Kentucky schools were not "efficient."'89 The decision called for a funda-
mental overhaul of the public elementary and secondary school system
and specified detailed standards necessary to any "efficient" system of edu-
cation.' 90 The Rose court identified seven capabilities that an educated
child must possess:
(i) sufficient oral and written communications skills to en-
able students to function in a complex and rapidly changing
civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social,
and political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of govern-
mental processes to enable the student to understand the
issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation;
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her
mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the
arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural
and historic heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation
for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields
so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work
intelligently; and (vii) sufficient level of academic or voca-
tional skills to enable public school students to compete
185. Thro,JudicialAnalysis, supra note 71, at 614.
186. Id. at 612.
187. 790 S.W2d 186 (1989).
188. Id. at 206.
189. Id. at 212. The state of education in Kentucky in the 1980's was indeed dismal.
Kentucky was fiftieth among states in adult literacy and adults with high school diplomas,
forty-ninth in college attendance rates, forty-eighth in per pupil expenditures, and forty-
eighth in per capita expenditures. Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and
Educational Reform in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 486 (1999) [hereinafter Hunter, All
Eyes Forward]. Kentucky students also ranked very low in most measures of student
achievement. Id.
190. 790 S.W2d at 209-13.
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favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in
academics or in the job market. 191
The Kentucky legislature responded rapidly by enacting the Ken-
tucky Education Reform Act ("KERA"). '92 Reform efforts included a
more equitable division of funding among school districts, ungraded pri-
mary schools, school-based decision-making, preschool programs,
extended school services, a reorganized state Department of Education,
and a testing system. 1 3 Results from 1993-1997 were promising, but on
the whole the performance gap between advantaged and disadvantaged
schools has widened dramatically since KERA's passage.19 4 The Kentucky
data suggest that even when courts, legislatures, and other actors work
together, school reform efforts face daunting challenges in helping chil-
dren overcome generations of poverty and underperformance.1
9
5
These results are sobering because in many ways Kentucky is a
model for reform that other states have sought to emulate. By specifically
defining the contours of the constitutional entitlement, the Kentucky
Supreme Court created a structure for the legislature to follow and politi-
cal cover for the painful budgetary decisions that would be required to
enact the needed reforms. Kentucky's experience demonstrates that under
certain circumstances, courts and legislatures can work together as part-
ners in education reform. On the other hand, as discussed infra Part VI,
sometimes effective reforms may require attention to factors outside of
the K-12 system that were not fully incorporated into KERA.
Massachusetts offers another model for collaboration between state
courts and state legislatures. Soon after Rose, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court decided McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educa-
tion.'96 Perhaps because a legislative effort to reform the education finance
system was already underway in Massachusetts, the McDuffy court was
more deferential to the legislature. Quoting Rose, the McDuffy court out-
lined the same seven elements as guidelines for fulfilling the constitutional
duty197 However, the McDuffy court deferred to the legislature's ongoing
efforts to give content to those broad standards: "Thus, we leave it to the
magistrates and the Legislatures to define the precise nature of the task
191. Id. at 212.
192. 1990 Ky. Acts 476 (codified as amended in scattered sections of KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
Tit. XIII).
193. See Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope, supra note 65, at 534.
194. See Philip W Roeder, EDUCATION REFORM AND EQUITABLE EXCELLENCE:
THE KENTUCKY EXPERIMENT 3 (updated Feb. 2000), at http://www.uky.edu/-proeder/
kerabkupdate.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Roeder, KENTUCKY EXPERIMENT]
(on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
195. See id.
196. 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
197. Id. at 554.
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which they face in fulfilling their constitutional duty to educate our chil-
dren today, and in the future.
'"1 98
The Massachusetts state legislature's reforms increased state funding
for public schools, created stricter teacher certification standards, man-
dated curricular frameworks, and linked competency in some areas of the
curriculum to education standards.' 99 The Massachusetts Department of
Education relied on high stakes testing to evaluate the success of the re-'00 -• 20
forms. This approach has been highly controversial. Test results suggest
that reform efforts still have a long way to go to remedy inequalities in
educational opportunities and performance. In 1998 and 1999, failure
rates remained high and there was a large gap between White and minor-
ity performance. 2
C.Adequacy and Race
Efforts to remedy racial segregation have historically been litigated
separately from school finance reform and the two fields of law fit to-
gether awkwardly. Professor James Ryan makes a powerful argument that
education finance reform scholars and litigators have historically failed to
pay sufficient attention to the potential relationship between school fi-
nance reform and desegregation.2 3 This Article argues that the adequacy
198. Id. at 557.
199. 1993 Mass.Acts 71 (codified as amended in scattered sections of MASS. GEN LAWS
ch. 71).
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope, supra note 65, at 536 (arguing that "[ajs
in Kentucky, Massachusetts is trying to measure outcome, but it is doing so in a way that
often harms the students it intends to help"); Boston Globe Editorial: MCAS Meaning, Boston
Globe, March 14, 2002, at A14 (criticizing a Department of Education proposal
that MCAS results be placed on students' transcripts because the MCAS are for measuring
school systems not students); but see Acting Governor Jane Swift, State of Education
Address 2001, (Aug. 30, 2001), available at http://www.state.ma.us/gov/speech/
sp083001stateofeducation.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) (on file with the Michigan
Journal of Race & Law) (arguing that "[tJest scores are the best tools parents and educators
have to identify where schools and students are succeeding or struggling.And they prevent
all of us ... from hiding from our obligations. I firmly believe that kids don't fail because
we raise expectations; we fail kids if we don't.").
202. See Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope, supra note 65, at 536; Steve Leblanc, Racial
Gap Evident in MAICAS, So. COAST DAILY, July 26, 2001, available at http://www.s-
t.com/daily/07-01/07-26-01/a031o015.htm (last visited March 16, 2002) (on file with the
Michigan Journal of Race & Law). For a summary of Massachusetts Comprehensive
Assessment System ("MCAS") results, see MCAS Tests, BOSTON GLOBE, at http://
www.boston.com/mcas/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) (on file with the Michigan Journal of
Race & Law).
203. See Ryan, Schools, Race, & Money, supra note 158, at 255 (arguing that scholars and
litigators have failed to pay sufficient attention to the relationship between school finance
and desegregation); see also Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope, supra note 65, at 528 (arguing
that "[r]eform efforts are further complicated by the willingness of many on both sides of
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approach offers the theoretical flexibility necessary to accommodate core
concerns of both school finance and racial segregation cases. Indeed, some
scholars and courts seem to be moving in the direction of a more race-
conscious approach to school finance reform.0 4
Racial segregation has a demonstrably adverse effect on educational
opportunity and on the whole, racial integration improves educational
outcomes for most students.2 6 Historical data suggest a correlation be-
tween racial integration and improved academic performance of minority
students. Professor Orfield demonstrates that the period of desegregation
corresponded with a dramatic narrowing of the achievement gap in test
scores between whites and African Americans; likewise, he found that
207during the period of resegregation, the gap widened.. A recent study of
Cambridge, Massachusetts school children suggests positive educational
effects of racial and ethnic integration. Likewise, a longitudinal study of
students at the University of Michigan showed that by exposing students
to multiple perspectives, diversity of racial backgrounds helps students to
think critically and to understand more complex issues. 2°9 Racial integra-
tion in schools benefits students in terms of college attendance rates,
employment, and living in integrated settings as adults."0 Socioeconomic
the political aisle to abandon racial integration as an issue in education"); but see Richard
D. Kahlenberg, Race-Based Remedies: Rethinking the Process of Classification and Evaluation:
Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. Rav. 1037, 1037-38 (1996) (arguing that the
United States should "provide preferences in education, employment, and government
contracting based on class or socio-economic status, rather than race or gender - implicitly
addressing the current-day legacy of past discrimination without resorting to the toxic
remedy of biological preference.").
204. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1281 (Conn. 1996) (holding that "the
existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation in the public school system deprives
schoolchildren of a substantially equal educational opportunity and requires the state to
take further remedial measures"); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 551 (directing
New York state to take steps to remedy the negative effect of racial isolation on student
achievement); Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope, supra note 65, at 528.
205. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 551.
206. See Michael Kurlaender & John T.Yun, Impact of Racial and Ethnic Diversity on Edu-
cational Outcomes: Cambridge, MA School District 2 (January, 2002), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.Harvard.edu/research/diversity/Cambridge-diversity.pdf (last visited
December 4, 2002) [hereinafter Kurlaender & Yun, Impact of Racial and Ethnic Diversity] (on
file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
207. Orfield, Schools More Separate, supra note 5, at 10.
208. See Kurlaender &Yun, Impact of Racial and Ethnic Diversity, supra note 206.
209. See id. at 3 (citing Patricia Gurin,"The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher
Education," expert testimony in Gratz v Bollinger, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11807 (E.D.
Mich. 1998), and Gruttner v. Bollinger, 16 E Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 1998)).
210. Orfield, Schools More Separate, supra note 5, at 9.
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diversity also seems to benefit poorer students both academically and so-
cially.2"
This Article argues that a workable constitutional definition of
adequacy should include the social and educational benefits of integrated
schools.2 2 After a series of dramatic victories during the Warren Court
era, plaintiffs have recently faced seemingly insuperable obstacles to
desegregating schools through the federal courts. State adequacy litigation
rather than traditional federal desegregation litigation offers the most
promising avenue for remedying the continuing racial segregation in our
school systems.
D. School Desegregation Cases
Brown2 13 famously declared the Plessy v. Ferguson214 regime of "Sepa-
rate but Equal" to be unconstitutional and outlawed dejure segregation of
public schools. 215 At the time, there was significant debate within the civil
rights community about whether to seek integration of the schools or to
pursue a strategy that demanded separate but truly equal schools.216
211. Ryan, Schools, Race, & Money, supra note 158, at 255 n.19 (arguing that integrating
students of different socioeconomic backgrounds benefits poorer students academically
and socially); but see McUsic, Laws Role, supra note 12, at 91 (arguing that "poor students
perform better when studying among students who are not poor, [but that] students who
are not poor do worse studying among those who are").
212. Part VI returns to these issues and suggests that the true integration of schools may
require policy-makers to address related issues such as housing policy in order to make
meaningful strides in this area.
213. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that
racial segregation in Washington, D.C. public schools violated the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment).
214. 163 US. 537 (1896) (sustaining a Louisiana law requiring separate but equal ac-
commodations on railroads); see also id. at 544 ("The most common instance of this is
connected with the establishment of separate schools for White and colored children,
which have been held to be a valid exercise of legislative power even by courts of States
where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly en-
forced.").
215. In Brown, the court declared that "[today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of educa-
tion to our democratic society ... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms." Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
216. JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN v. BoARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE
& ITS TROUBLED LEGACY xxvi-xxvii (2001) [hereinafter PATTERSON, CIVIL RIGHTS MILE-
sTONE]. Additionally, some African-American leaders, such as Julius Chambers, wondered if
dejure desegregation would do much for racial justice. See id. at xxvi. Others, such as Zora
Neale Hurston, criticized Brown for insinuating that all-black institutions were second rate.
See id. at xxvi-xxvii.
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Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund decided that
ending de jure segregation of schools was the best strategy for remedying
injustice in education.1 7 Almost fifty years later, the promise of Brown re-
mains unfulfilled.
Compliance with Brown was slow and contentious. After Brown /,",
the Supreme Court responded to "massive resistance, 21 9 to desegregation
220in the South on a couple of occasions. In 1964, 98% of African-
American children in the South were still attending 100% African-
American schools.2 When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it created incentives for desegregation and penalties for resistance
by making federal funding contingent upon nondiscrimination and
authorizing the Justice Department to bring suit to enforce the law.22 In
Green v. County School Board,224 the Supreme Court infused some urgency
into Brown's mandate, holding that "[tihe burden on a school board today
is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now. 221 The 1971 decision in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education26 rejected the argument that
neighborhood school assignments could legitimize segregation in areas
with a history of discrimination and authorized busing as a remedy.
Plaintiffs faced significant obstacles when they could not demon-
strate that desegregation resulted from a history of de jure segregation. In
217. See PATTERSON, CrvIL RIGHTS MILESTONE, supra note 216, at 21.
218. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (requiring that defendants "make a prompt and reasonable
start" toward complying with Brown I).
219. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 105, at 733.
220. Cooper v.Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (affirming Brown in light of resistance in Little
Rock, Arkansas); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964)
(holding that a county's plan to close its public schools and give grants to White children
to attend private schools was unconstitutional).
221. Gary Orfield, Conservative Activists and the Rush Toward Resegregation, in LAW &
SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 39, 42 (Jay P
Heubert ed., 1999) [hereinafter Orfield, Conservative Activists]; see also id. at 42-43 (arguing
that while the Supreme Court provided "important symbolic leadership" in the 1950s and
1960s, the only period in which there was "clear and effective judicial leadership" was
from 1968-1973, "immediately following the most active period of political and social
mobilization for civil rights since reconstruction:").
222. Pub. L. 88-352, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 5 2000) (2000).
223. Orfield, Conservative Activists, supra note 221, at 46.
224. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (rejecting freedom of choice rules that failed to produce a
"unitary, nonracial system of public education").
225. Id. at 439; see also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 105, at
734 (explaining that Green clearly shifted the emphasis from purification of the decisional
process to achievement of a result on the theory that integration was the only acceptable
evidence that the process had been purified).
226. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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Keyes v. School District No. 1,127 the Supreme Court declined to rule that
segregation was inherently illegal regardless of its origins, but did hold
that segregation could be the result of deliberate acts by government offi-
cials even where state law had never explicitly mandated segregation.
Thus, Brown's mandate did not require desegregation of school systems
that were segregated de facto because of housing patterns rather than in-
tentional state actions, but state action could be deemed to include
segregation in the north under some circumstances.
After Keyes, the trend towards defendants' victories continued. By the
mid-1970s, the Supreme Court decisions on desegregation became much
less favorable to plaintiffs. In Milliken v. Bradley,2 predominantly White-
suburban schools were not required to participate in an inter-district rem-
edy without evidence that the suburban schools had discriminated against
229~minority students. As Professor Molly McUsic writes: "[a]fter Milliken
there was no practical remedy for minority students concentrated in
school districts with few white students; and that describes most minority
students in the north and west."230 On remand, the district court ordered
educational improvements to make up for the harms of segregation,
23 1
essentially reverting to Plessy's implicit goal of making separate schools
equal.232 The Supreme Court affirmed in Milliken 11.2
33
Judicial decisions in the 1990s swung sharply away from desegrega-
234tion. For example, Jenkins v. Missouri23s limited the compensatory
remedies available to successful plaintiffs by disallowing attempts to draw
suburban Whites into urban Black schools, efforts to raise salaries to at-
tract and retain teachers, and efforts to examine test scores to ensure that
the remedies were effective over time. Other recent cases have also hin-
dered desegregation efforts. 36
227. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
228. 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see also id. at 745 ("without an inter-district violation and
inter-district effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an inter-district remedy");
but see Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (authorizing consideration of an area-wide
remedy in the housing-discrimination context).
229. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 744-45.The court also declined to consider the
role of housing, despite the fact that decades of discrimination in federal, state, and local
housing policy contributed significantly to school segregation in the first place. See infra
note 402.
230. McUsic, Laws Role, supra note 12, at 102.
231. Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
232. See Orfield, Conservative Activists, supra note 221, at 48.
233. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
234. See Orfield, Conservative Activists, supra note 221, at 43 (arguing that the activism by
the Supreme Court in the 1990s was "toward resegregation").
235. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
236. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237
(1991).
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Plaintiffs' recent failure to remedy racial segregation through federal
equal protection litigation is particularly troubling given the recent trend
towards racial resegregation.23 7 Today, our nation and particularly our public
238
education system remain racially separate and radically unequal.
Although de jure racial segregation of schools is illegal, defacto segregation
in fact increased in the 1990s. 239 In the 1998 academic year, 70% of
African-American children attended predominantly minority schools, up
from 66% in 1991 and 63% in 1980.240 In 1968, about 20% of Latino
students attended largely segregated schools. In 1998, that number has
grown to more than one-third of students.241 In New York, 60.3% of
African-American students attended schools that were 90-100% minority
in 1998; only 13.8% of African Americans attended predominantly White
schools.242 Racial segregation produces schools that are deeply unequal in
243
ways that go beyond unequal budgets.
The resegregation of public schools came in spite of-not because
of-popular opinion.2" Gallup Poll data show that a large percentage of
Americans want integrated schools and believe that integrated schools are
good for African Americans. 24' Half of those polled also believed racial
integration improved the education of whites.2 6 In fact, 59% of Ameri-
cans believe more needs to be done to improve racial integration in
schools.247
Equity strategies of school finance reform at best would accomplish
Plessy's goal of a separate but equal America. Though even this deeply
flawed goal remains elusive, more ambitious reform measures must seek to
fulfill Brown's promise as well.
State litigation under an adequacy theory-rather than federal litiga-
tion or state equity litigation-offers the most promise for desegregating
public schools. After Keyes v. School District No. 1,24" a federal constitutional
237. Orfield, Schools More Separate, supra note 5, at 2.
238. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court & the Failure to Achieve
Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 999 (1994) [hereinafter Lost Oppor-
tunity] (arguing that "American schools are separate and unequal. To a very large degree,
schools are not equal in their resources or their quality ... forty years after Brown ... pro-
claimed that separate can never be equal in public education,American schools are racially
segregated and grossly unequal.").
239. Orfield, Schools More Separate, supra note 5, at 2.
240. Id. at 32.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 41.
243. Id. at 11.
244. Id. at 7.
245. Id. at 6.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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challenge would probably not lead to an order desegregating school sys-
tems that were segregated defacto because of housing patterns rather than
intentional state actions. However, it may sometimes be possible to find
the judicial and political will to address racial segregation directly through
the state courts.
Recently, a progressive decision in Connecticut took seriously the
idea that integration was an important component of an adequate
education. In Sheff v. O'Neill, 49 minority school children alleged that de
facto racial segregation deprived them of an adequate education.5 0 African
Americans and Latinos constituted 25.7% of the public school population
in Connecticut, but more than 98% of certain school districts in
Hartford.2 1' The Connecticut Supreme Court found that the Connecticut
constitution imposed on the legislature an affirmative obligation to
provide the minority children with an education substantially equal to
that enjoyed by non-minority children.2 52 This ruling was made possible
in part by a unique clause in the Connecticut constitution that "[n]o
person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to
segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her
civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national
origin, sex or physical or mental disability.2 5 3 The court did not require
that the discrimination result from intentional government action and
held that failure to remedy was sufficient to create a justiciable issue.5 4
The Sheff court proclaimed access to an un-segregated educational
environment was a significant component of equal educational
255
opportunity.
In response to the Connecticut Supreme Court's ruling, the state
legislature passed a law that sought to reduce racial segregation in schools.
The Connecticut state legislature required the state board of education to
develop a five-year implementation plan, and allowed the state to sue to
enforce the law.5 6 School districts that fail to meet the law's objectives can
257lose state funding. A subsequent suit claiming that racial segregation in
the Hartford schools had in fact increased between 1996 and 1999 was
2581dismissed as premature.
249. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
250. Id. at 1281.
251. Id. at 1272-73.
252. Id. at 1281-82.
253. CoNN. CONST. art. I, § 20.
254. Sheff, 678A.2d at 1283.
255. Id. at 1281-82.
256. 1997 Conn.Acts 97-290 (Reg. Sess.).
257. Sheffv. O'Neill, 733 A.2d 925,927 (Conn. 1999) (quoting 1997 Conn. Acts 97-
290, § 1).
258. Id. at 938.
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PART II.
EDUCATION REFORM IN NEWYORK
Like Sheff, a recent trial court decision in New York also looked at
school finance reform and racial integration efforts as related legal ques-
tions. The Appellate Division reversed and the case is up on appeal to the
Court of Appeals.
The "savage inequalities" of the NewYork public school system have
been dramatically publicized by activists such as Jonathan Kozol." 9 In
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State,16 0 the plaintiffs convinced a New York
trial court that the education finance system: (1) violated the state consti-
tution;26' and (2) had "an adverse and disparate impact" on minority
students in violation of the implementing regulations262 of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.263
The trial court's first task was to determine what constitutes a
"sound basic education. 2 6 4 Justice DeGrasse found that the term "sound
basic education" connotes an education that provides students with the
skills needed to become productive citizens. 26' Rejecting the state's
assertion that this requirement could be met by passing the Regents
Competency Tests, 266 the court determined that schools should impart
the skills necessary to: (1) be informed voters;267 (2) be competent
259. See KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES, supra note 1, at 83-132.
260. 719 N.YS.2d at 478.
261. The New York Constitution mandates that "[t]he legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of
this state may be educated." N.Y CONST. art. XI, 5 1. It is interesting to note that this clause
falls within the weakest category in Professor Ratner's taxonomy of education clauses. See
Ratner, supra note 182, at 815 n.143.Justice DeGrasse's progressive opinion was aided by
the fact that the NewYork Court of Appeals has interpreted this to require that the state
provide a "sound basic education." Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 (N.Y
1982). Nevertheless, the trial court opinion seems to lend some support for Patt's conten-
tion that the strength of education clauses has little determinative effect on the plaintiffs'
rates of success. See Patt, School Finance Battles, supra note 24, at 555; see generally supra note
184.
262. 34 C.F.R. 100.3 (2002).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2002).
264. Cf Bd. of Ed. Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 369
(finding that where the average per pupil expenditure of NewYork State exceeded that in
all other States but two, a sound basic education had been provided).
265. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
266. Id. at 485. The Regents Competency Tests measure the reading, writing and
mathematic competency required of eighth to ninth graders. Id.
267. Students must be given the skills necessary to understand complex issues such as
campaign finance reform, tax policy, and global warming. Id.
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jurors; 268 and (3) compete for employment. 269 Justice DeGrasse also
declined to use the Regents Learning Standards to define a "sound basic
education," fearing that this would delegate to a state agency the power to
define a constitutional right.7 0
To assess whether NewYork was failing to provide all students with a
sound, basic education, the trial court opinion proceeded to evaluate both
inputs and outputs. Under the input inquiry, the court determined that
New York had failed to provide (1) qualified personnel;2 7 1 (2) adequate
facilities and small class size;272 and (3) instrumentalities of learning.2 3
Likewise, the court determined that educational outputs were inadequate,
including: (1) graduation/dropout rates; 274 (2) performance on standard-
ized tests; 273 (3) nature of the degrees received; and (4) performance of
those who pursue higher education. Furthermore, the court revisited the
debate over the causal link between funding inadequacies and educational
opportunity,276 and held that etiology had been sufficiently established by
the plaintiffs.7 7
The brief remedial order focused primarily on ensuring that the
state remedy the input-based deficiencies by providing qualified teach-
ers, appropriate class sizes, adequate physical infrastructure, sufficient
instrumentalities of learning, suitable curricula, adequate resources for
students with extraordinary needs, and a safe, orderly environment. 1 8 The
court instructed the state as a threshold matter to ascertain the actual costs
'791of providing a sound basic education, with particular emphasis on:
268. Schools must provide the "verbal, reasoning, math, science, and socialization skills"
necessary to determine questions of fact in a jury trial involving DNA evidence, statistical
analysis, or financial fraud. Id.
269. Id. at 487.
270. Id. at 484.
271. Among other things, the court found that the least qualified teachers by objective
measurements were disproportionately concentrated in NewYork City's lowest performing
schools. Id. at 493-97.The court also pointed to salary differentials and shrinking invest-
ment in arts and physical education as obstacles that made delivery of the core curriculum
even harder. Id. at 498-500.
272. Id. at 501-13.
273. The court found that New York failed to provide sufficient textbooks, library
books, classroom supplies and equipment, and instructional technology. Id. at 513-15.
274. Id. at 515-17. Rejecting the defendants' argument that they should not be blamed
for high dropout rates, Justice DeGrasse found that "when 30% of students drop out of
school without obtaining even a GED, serious questions arise about system breakdown."
Id. at 517.
275. Id. at 517-19.
276. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
277. Canpaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 520-26.
278. Id. at 550.
279. The current estimate is that the overhaul would cost at least 1 billion dollars per
year. See Abby Goodnough, State Asks Court to Overturn School Financing Ruling, N.Y TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2001, at D3 [hereinafter Goodnough State Asks Court].
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(1) ensuring that every school district has adequate resources; (2) taking
into account variations in local costs; (3) providing stable funding to en-
sure long-term planning; (4) providing transparency so that the public
may understand how NewYork distributes school aid;280 and (5) ensuring
a system of accountability to measure whether the reforms implemented
by the legislature actually provide the opportunity for a sound basic edu-
281
cation and remedy the disparate impact of the school finance system.
2812
Finally, with reference to James Ryan, the trial court directed the state
to examine the effects of racial isolation and its relationship to student
achievement; the court suggested that in some cases increased racial and
socioeconomic integration might be a more cost effective solution to his-
torically under-performing schools than an approach that focused
exclusively on increased funding to schools with a high percentage of mi-
283
noritles. Like the Connecticut Supreme Court in SheffJustice DeGrasse
took seriously the idea that extreme defacto segregation is itself a problem
that the state should be required to overcome as part of an education re-
form remedy.
On June 25, the Appellate Division reversed. Justice Lerner, writing
for the court, held that the New York state constitution's guarantee of a
"sound basic education" required that schools provide only an eighth or
ninth grade skill level.8 The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not
proven that the education provided by the New York City schools failed
2851
to provide this minimum level of adequacy or that any insufficiencies
were caused by the state funding system. 28 Finally, the court concluded
that the plaintiff's Title VI claim had been overruled by the United States
2817
Supreme Court.
The parties agreed that some of the disparities in test scores resulted
from demographic factors such as poverty, high crime rates, high rates of
single parenting, homes where English is not spoken, or homes where
parents offer little motivation or assistance with homework.288 One of the
plaintiffs' witnesses, Dr. David Grissmer, conceded that investing money in
the family rather than in the schools, might pay off even more.2 9 On the
280. Cf id. (describing the "bewildering array of formulas used by New York to dis-
tribute state aid").
281. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 550-51.
282. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
283. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
284. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130, 138 (N.YApp. Div. 2002)
285. Id. at 139.
286. Id. at 144.
287. Id. at 146; see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that there is
no private right of action to enforce Title VI regulations).




basis of these obstacles, the Appellate Division concluded that "more
spending on education is not necessarily the answer ... the cure lies in
eliminating the socio-economic conditions facing certain students."290
Earlier in the opinion, Justice Lerner reasoned that "the State must offer
all children the opportunity of a sound basic education, not ensure that
they actually receive it."29' The Appellate Division implicitly concluded,
therefore, that the state can theoretically fulfill its obligation to provide the
"opportunity" for a sound basic education by providing minimally ade-
quate inputs to students in communities where systematic obstacles
prevent any of them from actually receiving an adequate education. As
Justice Saxe argued in dissent:
The State ... contend[s] that deficiencies in student per-
formance that are attributable to socioeconomic conditions
extrinsic to the education system are not relevant to assess-
ing whether schools are meeting constitutional standards. It
takes the position that once socioeconomic factors are fac-
tored out, spending has no significant impact on students
obtaining an education. Stated another way, this argument
limits the State's responsibility to that of providing whatever
educational experience would be necessary for some theo-
retical student, without any socioeconomic disadvantages, to
obtain the requisite education ... To properly weigh
whether a minimally adequate education is being offered to
New York City's public school students, the actual circum-
stances and needs of all the students must be considered. It is
not enough that a portion of the City's students can obtain
an adequate education, where it is demonstrated that an-
other large segment of students is unable to do so, especially
when this inability is caused by the school system's failure to
provide the necessary programs, facilities and educational
approaches due to a lack of sufficient funding.
29 2
At its core, the dispute between the trial court and the Appellate Di-
vision centers around the scope of the state's duty and the meaning of
causality. The Appellate Division treats the state's duty as limited to the
provision of minimally adequate inputs, even where predictable and ascer-
tainable obstacles prevent a large percentage of the city's poorest children
from actually obtaining a "sound, basic education" when confronted with
these obstacles. Similarly, the Appellate Division's view of causality sug-
gests that the causal link is disrupted when socioeconomic factors
extrinsic to the school system also present obstacles to the attainment of a
290. Id.
291. Id. at 143.
292. Id. at 153-54.
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sound, basic education, even where the trial court reasonably concluded
that the school financing system itself created myriad imposing obstacles.
Thus, the Appellate Division's conception of the state's duty to educate
children stops abruptly at the schoolhouse door. By radically limiting the
notion of educational "opportunity" in this way, the Appellate Division
renders the notion of a "sound basic education" virtually meaningless.
The parties agree that socioeconomic factors extrinsic to the K-12
educational system present significant obstacles to the provision of a
sound basic education to the city's poorest schoolchildren. Nevertheless,
the trial court structured a narrow remedy that focused almost entirely on
factors intrinsic to the school system. In contrast, the Appellate Division
concluded that the existence of extrinsic factors limited the state's educa-
tional duties to minimal inputs and ignored the possibility of a broader
remedial strategy. This Article takes issue with both approaches and instead
suggests that the state's duty to provide an adequate education is rendered
meaningless if it stops abruptly at the schoolhouse door and suggests that
a meaningful remedial order must also target a limited number of extrin-
sic factors that have a direct effect on educational opportunity.
Poverty, racial segregation, and other concomitant obstacles indubita-
bly limit the educational opportunities of poor children in NewYork and
elsewhere. For this reason, a remedial order that ignores factors extrinsic
to the school system (narrowly defined) is unlikely to result in significant
progress. Radically limiting the definition of educational "opportunity"
undermines the very purpose of creating a state duty to provide a "sound
basic education." In contrast, a remedial order that acknowledges that
educational opportunity is inextricably interwoven with other socioeco-
nomic factors offers great potential for fulfilling the state's constitutional
obligation to provide a "sound basic education" to all its school children.
PART III.
REMEDIES:TRANSLATING SUCCESS IN THE COURTROOM
INTO SUCCESS IN THE CLASSROOM
As Professor McUsic points out, "winning in the courtroom is not
the same as winning in the classroom., 29 Some of the most successful
school litigation cases have not immediately led to significant changes in
the actual educational opportunities of children. Disparities still exist in
funding levels and/or outcomes in both Kentucky 94 and Massachusetts. 295
California slipped from around the median in the country in per pupil
education expenditure to thirty-eighth during the time since its landmark
293. McUsic, Law's Role, supra note 12, at 108.
294. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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school finance case.2 96 The plaintiffs' initial victory in New Jersey required
291
twelve more proceedings over the past twenty years. In Connecticut,
racial segregation has actually increased since Sheff was decided in 1996. 298
This is not to say that education reform litigation has failed, just that
much remains to be done even in states where plaintiffs have won signifi-
cant victories in the courts.
The CFE case will ultimately be decided by the NewYork Court of
Appeals. If the plaintiffs prevail, it will probably require a legislative re-
299
sponse and additional spending in excess of one billion dollars per year.
The challenges facing the Court of Appeals are immense. If the court
determines that the state school system is unconstitutionally inadequate, it
should issue a remedial order that sets goals, allocates roles, catalyses steps
towards meaningful reform, enables on-going mechanisms for evaluating
progress (or lack thereof, and creates a structure for further judicial action
in the event that the unconstitutional inadequacy continues.
In structuring a remedial order, the court also faces a number of
other delicate tasks. It must work out the scope of an affirmative right in a
society accustomed to negative liberties. It must effectively orchestrate
relationships between three co-equal branches of government. It must
avoid overstepping the boundaries of its expertise and authority, without
abdicating its responsibility for ensuring that constitutional rights will be
vindicated and constitutional duties will be fulfilled. Finally, it must offer
guidelines specific enough to make the constitutional obligation mean-
ingful, but simultaneously flexible enough to adjust to practical difficulties
of implementation and the highly individualized needs of each commu-
nity.
Justice DeGrasse's remedy is a compelling start, but it does not begin
to answer many of the thorniest questions of institutional design, over-
sight, and implementation. Building from the trial court's opinion in the
CFE case, this Article argues that an education reform proposal that is
implemented today after a finding that a state has violated a state constitu-
tional duty should have the following characteristics: (1) it should equalize
funding to the extent necessary to set input-based minima; (2) it should
take seriously Brown's proclamation that separate is inherently unequal;
296. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
297. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (NJ. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 396 A.2d 65
(NJ. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d 193 (NJ. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A2d 713
(NJ. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d
457 (NJ. 1976);Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (NJ. 1985);Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359
(NJ. 1990);Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994);Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J.
1997); Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J.
2000). It is interesting to note, however, the New Jersey now has the highest per pupil
spending of any state in the nation. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
298. Sheffv. O'Neill, 733 A.2d 925,938 (Conn. 1999).
299. See Goodnough, State Asks Court, supra note 279.
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(3) it should create a firm but limited role for the courts to protect the
constitutional rights of minorities from majoritarian failures without ex-
ceeding the courts' limited expertise; (4) it should be specific enough to
minimize inter-branch tension; (5) it should facilitate broad-based col-
laboration between courts, legislatures, state agencies, local school boards,
unions, parents, local businesses, and civic organizations; (6) it should make
states accountable for outcomes; and (7) it should be flexible enough to
allow state and local decision-makers to view the problem holistically and
to innovate beyond traditional education finance remedies.
A. Setting Input Floors
As discussed above, there has been significant debate regarding the
effect of money on education.300 After extensive testimony from scholars
like Eric Hanushek and Ronald Ferguson and other evidence, Justice
DeGrasse found that the plaintiffs had shown a causal link between fund-
ing and educational opportunity.3° ' The Appellate Division, in contrast,
held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a causal link by anything
30'more than a res ipsa loquitor rationale. To the extent that funding levels
are reflected in other factors such as class size, teacher salaries, facilities,
and infrastructure, this Article argues that Justice DeGrasse was wise to
incorporate this data into his remedy, which set the minimum inputs
states would be responsible for ensuring that each school district pro-
vides.3 3 After controlling for family and community background factors,
Professor Ferguson suggests that educational opportunities improve when
schools have more literate and experienced teachers and fewer large
304classes. It may be necessary to ensure that poorer schools have enough
funding to provide higher salaries as an incentive for the best teachers to
accept jobs in poorer districts.30 ' Where schools districts cannot afford
structurally safe buildings,30 6 this may need to be remedied to provide a
minimum adequate learning environment. Although causality is extremely
controversial in the education finance context, Justice DeGrasse heard
extensive testimony throughout a seven-month trial and reasonably con-
cluded that there was a causal link between the funding structure and the
under-performance of many NewYork City schools.
300. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
301. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 520-26.
302. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 744 N.Y.S. 2d at 143.
303. See Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope, supra note 65, at 528.
304. See Ferguson, Paying for Public Education, supra note 63, at 488.
305. Id. at 489.
306. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 762-68 (Ohio 1997).
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The trial court's remedy would be expensive, but it is well worth the
investment. Early estimates suggest that Justice DeGrasse's order would
cost more than one billion dollars per year.30 7 A recent poll conducted by
Zogby International found that 59% of New Yorkers believe that state
funding for education should be increased and 64% feel that improving
education is more important than holding down taxes.08 Governor
Pataki's proposed 2003 budget would reduce aid to school districts by
about $284 million.09 Even in a budget crisis, this approach may prove
penny wise and pound foolish.
The costs of meeting input-based minima are dwarfed by the likely
costs of inaction. The Commerce Department estimates that the United
States suffers a productivity loss of between $140 billion and $300 billion
annually that is directly traceable to adult worker illiteracy.31 Other stud-
ies suggest that functional illiteracy has an annual cost of around $224
billion in welfare, crime, incompetence, tax losses, and remedial educa-
tion.1 Finally, three-quarters of the five hundred biggest companies in
America spend about $300 million annually on remedial training for al-
most eight million workers.3 2 Systematically inadequate schools also hurt
the economy by contributing to cycles of unemployment and poverty.3 3
Low levels of literacy may also increase health care costs. The Na-
tional Institute for Literacy has found that 26% of adults with low literacy
levels reported health conditions that prevented them from fully partici-
pating in productive activities. Likewise, adults at low literacy levels have
difficulty availing themselves of health care services, taking medication,
understanding Medicare applications, and understanding health conditions
like asthma. 1'
Failure to invest in education may also lead to higher prison costs.
Studies have shown that prisoners tend to be less literate than the general
307. See Goodnough, State Asks Court, supra note 279.
308. Press Release, Alliance for Quality Education,Voters Overwhelmingly Prefer State
Tax Increases to Cuts in Education, at http://www.allianceforqualityeducation.org/
zrelease.htm1 (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race &
Law).
309. See Citizens Budget Commission, Achieving a Better Balance: Recommendations for the
New York State Budget for Fiscal Year 2003 1, 18 (March 21,2002), at http://www.cbcny.org/
cbcnys03.pdf (on file with Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
310. Schwartz, WhyJohnnys Parents Can't Read, supra note 15, at 191.
311. Id. at 192.
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Hunter, All Eyes Forward, supra note 189, at 487 (describing this phe-
nomenon in Kentucky in the 1980s).
314. See National Institute for Literacy, Literacy & Health, at http://novel.nifl.gov/
nifl/facts/health.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Literacy & Health] (on file with
the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
315. See id.
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adult population and that prisoner education programs reduce recidivism
316rates.
As Justice DeGrasse recognized, setting input-based minima is neces-
sary but not sufficient for reforming historically under-resourced and
under-performing schools.
B. Taking Race Into Account-Separate is Inherently Unequal
The trial court's opinion in CFE follows Sheff in directly addressing
defacto racial segregation, with explicit reference to Professor Ryan's com-
pelling thesis that school finance reform is incomplete without efforts to
overcome racial segregation.3 7 In spite of the fact that the Title VI claim
in CFE is no longer tenable, the final order would be wise to reinstate the
injunction that the state seek ways to remedy racial isolation as part of its
duty to provide a "sound basic education." As Brown warns, "[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal., 3'8 Likewise, at least in the
abstract, voters seem to favor more racial integration in education.3 '9 Even
in the absence of the state constitutional language utilized in Sheff20 and
the implementing regulations of Title VI, 3 2 1 state courts should consider
the educational benefits of racial integration in defining the contours of•322
state constitutional adequacy requirements.
PART IV
COURTS SHOULD PLAY A FIRM BUT LIMITED ROLE
AND ENCOURAGE BROAD COALITIONS
A. Balancing the Judicial Role
Courts should use their power and legitimacy to demand that the
political branches actually live up to their constitutional obligations to
minorities when majoritarian institutions fail over time.What courts do
well is protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority. For this reason,
constitutional law trumps acts of legislation. Alexander Hamilton argued
that "[a] constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by judges as a fun-
316. See National Institute for Literacy, Fact Sheet: Corrections Education, 1, 1-2 (2001) at
http://novel.nifl.gov/nifl/policy/prisonlitfactsheet.doc (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) [here-
inafter Corrections Education] (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
317. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 551.
318. 347 U.S. at 495.
319. See Orfield, Schools More Separate, supra note 5, at 6-7.
320. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1281-82; see alsoCONN. CoNsT. art. I, § 20.
321. 34 C.ER. § 100.3 (2002).
322. Cf supra note 206.
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damental law ... [and that] the constitution ought to be preferred to the
statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.,
323
Since Marbury v. Madison, 4 it is settled law that it is "the province and





Constitutions place certain priorities outside of the scope of majori-
tarian influence and declare them fundamental. State constitutions have
chosen to make education one of the fundamental rights the government
has an obligation to provide even if the political process would otherwise
321not provide it. Justice DeGrasse took an appropriately firm approach
when he declared that:
... the court's deference to the coordinate branches of State
government is contingent on these branches taking effective
and timely action to address the problems set forth in this
opinion.The parlous state of the City's schools demands no
less. The court will not hesitate to intervene if it finds that
the legislative and/or executive branches fail to devise and
implement necessary reform.327
What courts do not do well is create implementation plans and make
budgetary decisions. In addition to courts' general lack of expertise, we
should also be concerned about judicial activism because it cannot easily
be corrected through the electoral process.328 While this is a very real con-
cern in the school finance and school desegregation contexts, the
accepted role of the judiciary has evolved somewhat in the twentieth cen-
tury as public law litigation has developed. 329 The culmination of this
process, according to Professor Abram Chayes, is the remedial decree.330
Professor Chayes explained that under the new model "[t]he subject mat-
ter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private parties about private
rights, but a grievance about the operation of public policy.
' 331
323. See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, in SELECTED WRITINGS ANT
SPEECHES OFALEXANDER HAMILTON 179, 182 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 1985).
324. Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (1803).
325. Id. at 177.
326. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
327. Carnpaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d 475,550 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 2001).
328. Cf. 744 N.YS. 2d at 149 (Tom,J., concurring) ("For constitutional purposes, once
we as judges start micro-managing how a school system as vast and complicated as this
one is to be administered, and how funding is to be distributed to ensure that portions of
the student body are better served, we are really traversing a very problematic region that
is quintessentially administrative and perhaps even political in nature.We should do so only
with the greatest circumspection.").
329. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HA~v. L. REv. 1281
(1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Role of the Judge].
330. Id. at 1298-1302.
331. Id. at 1302.
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Judicial restraint may be less appropriate in the unusual context of an
affirmative duty than in the usual case where judges seek to prevent in-
fringement of negative liberties. State education clauses are sui generis in
that they create an affirmative obligation to provide a certain level of ser-
vices. As the Sheff court explained:
The affirmative constitutional obligation of the state to pro-
vide a substantially equal "educational opportunity ... differs
in kind from most constitutional obligations. Organic
documents only rarely contain provisions that explicitly re-
quire the state to act rather than to refrain from acting ...
educational equalization cases are in significant aspects sui
generis and not subject to analysis by accepted conventional
tests or the application of mechanical standards. The wealth
discrimination found among school districts differs materi-
ally from the usual equal protection case where a fairly
defined indigent class suffers discrimination to its peculiar
disadvantage. The discrimination is relative rather than abso-
lute.
3 2
A firm and continuing-but flexible-judicial role is essential to en-
sure that constitutional standards of adequacy are indeed met over time.
B. Specific Remedial Orders May Minimize Inter-branch Tension
Failure by courts to be specific in defining the state's constitutional
duty can lead to further proceedings and tension between the courts and
the legislature. In Robinson v. Cahill, 33 a vaguely worded finding that the
state system was unconstitutional led to twelve subsequent court opinions
over the course of more than two decades in New Jersey.3 4 New Jersey's
experience has recently recurred in Ohio. In DeRolph v. State I'331 the
Ohio Supreme Court found that the Ohio school financing system was
unconstitutional, but deferred to the state legislature in crafting the
remedy.336 As a result, the legislative remedy was soon challenged in the
courts.337 Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court evaluated the legislative
remedy and expressed concern that the system increased academic
332. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1281 (Conn. 1996)(quoting Horton v. Meskill,
376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977)).
333. 303 A.2d 273 (NJ. 1973).
334. See supra note 297.
335. 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997).
336. Id. at 747.
337. DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Ohio 2000); DeRolph v. State, 712
N.E.2d 125 (Ohio Ct. Corn. P1. 1999).
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requirements without providing adequate funding to meet the higher
standards.
By deferring to the legislature in broad terms to construct a remedy,
the DeRolph I court invited further proceedings. In contrast, in Kentucky,
the Rose opinion was very specific and KERA was passed soon after-
wards.339 Like Rose, Justice DeGrasse's CFE opinion clearly defines the
content of the constitutional requirement with reference to the skills nec-
essary to be an informed voter, a thoughtful juror, and a successful worker
J t.~~340Adiinlybod*ica
in an increasingly competitive job market. Additionally, bold judicial
action can encourage a strong legislative response in part by creating po-
litical cover for legislators who must make difficult decisions regarding
taxation or budget cuts in order to implement costly education reform
341
measures.
C. A Collaborative Model of Reform
Beyond setting outcome-based goals and input-based minima, actu-
ally deciding what measures are necessary to implement reform requires a
level of expertise courts simply do not possess. Additionally, concerns
about judicial activism and aggrandizement should be mitigated by in-
cluding a wide variety of stakeholders in implementing courts' remedies.
Finally, from Brown to the present, courts have had great difficulty imple-
menting education reform when they have had to struggle against public
opinion and other branches of state government.
To overcome these challenges, sound institutional design, careful role
allocation, and dialogical management techniques are fundamental com-
ponents of effective remedial orders that aim to remedy unconstitutional
inadequacies. The proper role of the court is to act as a goal-setter and
overseer, delegating implementation where possible but remaining in-
volved enough to ensure that progress is made towards fulfilling the
constitutional requirements.
Armed with the court's definition of the constitutional requirement,
legislators should be required to identify strategies for moving towards ade-
quacy, providing funding to make reform efforts feasible, and giving content
to broad,judicially-crafted goals. Likewise, through its implementing regula-
tions, the state Department of Education should act as a goal setter, a
manager, and an implementer with still greater specificity.
338. 728 N.E.2d at 1018. In many ways, DeRolph II is a very innovative and promising
opinion. Like the trial court in CFE, 719 N.YS.2d at 534, the Ohio Supreme Court in
DeRolph II recognized that "funding is only one aspect of a thorough and efficient system
of school." 728 N.E.2d at 1001.
339. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., Hunter, All Eyes Forward, supra note 189, at 485-86 (describing this phe-
nomenon in Kentucky).
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Education reform will fail, however, if it is simply a collaborative ef-
fort between the three statewide branches of government. A school
reform strategy that works for an entire state will draw on the expertise
and involvement of a diverse group of stakeholders including school
boards, school administrators, teachers, teachers' unions, parents, commu-
nity leaders, and local businesses to address the individual needs and values
of a local community. Although highly-localized funding structures con-
tribute to the problem of "savage inequalities" in educational
expenditures,342 local involvement in education may also be essential for
overcoming the problems faced by under-performing and under-
resourced schools. Limiting local control of schools is not a panacea.343
Some advocates have emphasized the importance of promoting pub-
lic dialogue in the implementation of education reform. For example,
Professor Michael Rebell (the plaintiffs' attorney in CFE) has argued that
"[i]n highly charged institutional reform litigation, courts should promote
broad-based public discussion and involvement in both the formulation of
the remedial principles and the implementation of the remedial
scheme."344 Desegregation and school finance experiments along these
lines have shown promise in Massachusetts, Kentucky, and Alabama.345 This
approach is also consistent with notions of discursive democracy such as
those advanced by contemporary German philosopher Jiurgen Haber-
346
mas.
Kentucky provides one model of collaboration. In Kentucky, a broad
coalition of stakeholders-brought together in part by a not-for-profit,
independent, volunteer citizens' advocacy organization called the Prichard
Committee--was instrumental in encouraging judicial and legislative ac-
tion on school reform.347  Likewise, a nonpartisan coalition of
342. See supra notes 24-50 and accompanying text.
343. Cf infra note 418.
344. Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement: The Remedies
Problem Posed by Sheff v. O'Neill-and a Proposed Solution, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1115, 1153
(1997) [ hereinafter Rebel, Efficacy and Engagement]; see also James S. Liebman & Charles F
Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance
and Legal Reform 10 at http://www.lawcolumbia.edu/sabel/papers/deweylab4.doc (last
visited Dec. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory] (on file with the
Michigan Journal of Law) (arguing that "a central lesson of the emerging school reforms is
that neither the separation of powers, the traditional forms of regulation associated with it,
nor even the fundamental distinction between a public and private-or political and tech-
nical-spheres can today be assumed. Consequently, the process of continuing regulatory
adjustment requires a more profound and pervasive process of institutional renovation and
a larger circle of participation in public decision making that redraws the distinction be-
tween public and private.").
345. See Rebell, Efficacy and Engagement, supra note 344, at 1155-58.
346. See id. at 1153 (citing JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs Ch. 8
(1996)).
347. See Hunter, All Eyes Forward, supra note 189, at 489-94.
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businesspeople, government officials, agricultural interests, labor leaders,
and educators called the Partnership for Kentucky Schools and other groups
have played key roles in implementing Kentucky's reform efforts. z8
Though education reform in Kentucky has had mixed results thus far, in
this respect at least it provides a helpful example for state courts seeking
to craft an education reform process that will avoid acrimony and pro-
mote collaboration in catalyzing, structuring, and implementing
comprehensive education reform.
D. Negotiated Rulemaking
A more aggressive approach to this dialogical model of remedies im-
plementation could be modeled on the administrative law concept of
Negotiated Rulemaking. In 1990, Congress passed the Negotiated Rule-
making Act to encourage negotiations between agencies and affected
parties prior to the "notice and comment" period required by the Admin-
310istrative Procedure Act. In a Negotiated Rulemaking, the agency head
appoints a convener to identify stakeholders and the topics to be de-
cided. 31t The affected parties form a committee with no more than
twenty-five members to seek consensus about how to implement the leg-
35,islative mandate. - The committee may then recommend that the agency
adopt the proposed rule.The agency still controls the process and has final
353say on whether to promulgate a specific rule, but seeks to reach a
unanimous agreement among affected stakeholders rather than to impose
a top-down solution. The primary goals of negotiated rulemaking are to
save time, reduce transaction costs, craft better rules, gather information
efficiently, foster trust among stakeholders, and prevent subsequent judicial
challenges to the final regulation.355 Perhaps most importantly, proponents
348. See id. at 504-12.
349. Pub.L. 101-648, § 3(a), 104 Stat. 4969 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. § 561-
70 (1996 & supp. 2000)), permanently reauthorized by the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-320, § 11(a), 110 Stat. 3870, 3873. For a summary
of Negotiated Rulemaking, see generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WItLIAMT. MAYtON, AD-
MINISTRATIvE LAW 298-300 (2001) [hereinafter ADMINSTRATIVE LAW].
350. 5 U.S.C. 553 (1994).
351. 5 U.S.C. 563 (1994).
352. 5 U.S.C. % 564-65 (1994).
353. A committee's power is limited to transmitting a report to the agency concerning
promulgation under the rule under consideration. See 5 U.S.C. § 566 (0 (1994).An agency
official's promise to abide by the ultimate consensus of participants in a regulated industry
is not enforceable in court. See U.S.A. Group Loan Services, Inc. v. Riley, 82 E3d 708,714-
15 (7th Cir. 1996).
354. U S.A. Group Loan Services, Inc., 82 E3d at 714.
355. There is significant debate over whether Negotiated Rulemaking accomplishes its
goals of reducing time spent developing regulations and reducing judicial challenges to
rulemaking. See ADMINISTRATIvE LAW, supra note 349, at 299-300.
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of negotiated rulemaking suggest that it increases the legitimacy of the
final rule in the eyes of those involved in its development.5 6
In the education reform context, this approach offers great promise
for crafting a strategy that takes advantage of the expertise of non-
governmental actors and considers the needs of individual communities.
After the court has specifically delineated the contours of the constitu-
tional entitlement, the court could instruct the legislature to convene an
ad hoc education reform committee chaired by the Secretary of Educa-
tion and including school board members, school administrators, teachers,
teachers' unions, parents, community leaders, and local businesspeople. For
reasons discussed infra in Part VI, representatives from agencies charged
with housing reform, family literacy, early childhood education, and other
related efforts should also participate in an advisory capacity.
The committee would be charged with creating a "blueprint" for
education reform, including: (1) costing out the input based minima;
(2) suggesting mechanisms for remedying de facto racial segregation of
schools and communities; (3) suggesting evaluation methods (such as
high stakes testing, graduation rates, drop-out rates, etc.) based on the best
available empirical research and the court's definition of what the consti-
tution requires; (4) suggesting implementation steps based on the
individual resources, needs, and values of individual communities or re-
gions; (5) recommending to the legislature what resources under-
performing school districts will need to take the required implementation
steps; (6) drafting best practice methods to assist school districts in using
those resources effectively;3 59 (7) establishing a procedure for determining
whether individual school districts are actually making progress towards
meeting the articulated goals and to help those that are falling behind; and
(8) determining the conditions under which a school district's persistent
inadequacy will give rise to more drastic steps (such as receivership) and
outlining a procedure for state takeover of consistently failing schools.
To whatever extent possible, the ad hoc committee should be com-
mitted to principles of consensus. Such an approach would create a broad
sense of ownership and involvement in the process and take advantage of
diverse opinions, values, and resources, while maintaining accountability
through judicial review and ultimate legislative accountability for out-
comes. As with negotiated rulemaking in the administrative law context, if
356. See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation & the Legitimacy
Benefit, 9 N.YU. ENVTL. L.J. 60,63 (2000).
357. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 550-51.
358. See id. at 551.
359. I.e., helping schools make choices about whether to use resources to decrease class
size, increase teacher salaries, hire more teaching aids, invest in more teacher training, pro-




the parties fail to reach a consensus, the state Department of Education
will be charged with unilateral imposition of an acceptable blueprint. Ei-
ther way, the plan should be presented to the court for review under a
highly deferential standard. Judicial review of a plan submitted after this
process should assess whether it is realistically calculated to move the
state's schools towards adequacy within a set time period.
PARTV
MAKE STATES ACCOUNTABLE FOR OUTCOMES
"Standards-based reform" has become a central component of the
federal education policy and the education policy of most states.36' The
vices and virtues of high stakes testing have been vigorously debated3 2
and states such as Massachusetts that have linked education reform efforts
to high-stakes testing may function as laboratories for what works and
what does not.363 Likewise, in determining that educational outcomes in
NewYork City were unconstitutionally inadequate, Justice DeGrasse took
in account students' performance on standardized tests,364 gradua-
tion/dropout rates,365 nature of the degrees received, and performance of
those who pursued higher education.
Determining what outcome-based measures to use to evaluate out-
comes presents an enormous challenge to courts both in the goal-setting
phase and in implementation phase. This may be an area where courts
should require the ad hoc comnittee to submit a recommendation for
judicial approval. Additionally, given the dynamic nature of education re-
form, some flexibility should be retained for judicial modification of the
outcome measurement tools based on new information, other states' ex-
periences, or an emerging consensus in the education profession.
360. Cf Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 344, at 90 (arguing that "the
court's intervention in effect institutionalizes the crisis, stripping the tatters of legitimacy
from the old system and obliging a choice between two imponderables-a court order
that will just as surely be fraught with unintended consequences as it is difficult to modify,
and a solution of the parties' own devising, subject to very general conditions imposed by
the court, but with the virtue that it can be adjusted again and again as circumstances
require").
361. See James Traub, The Test Mess, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002 at § 6, p. 4 6 [ hereinafter
Traub, Test Mess].
362. See generally id.
363. See supra note 201 (discussing the debate over high stakes testing in Massachu-
setts).
364. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 517-19.
365. Id. at 515-17. Rejecting the defendants' argument that they should not be blamed
for high dropout rates, the CFE trial court found that "when 30% of students drop out of
school without obtaining even a GED, serious questions arise about system breakdown."
Id. at 517.
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A. Environmental Law as a Model for Goal-Setting
and Coordinated Implementation
Once the courts, the legislature, the state Department of Education,
and the ad hoc committee have developed an approved blueprint, a
procedure should be developed to make state legislatures ultimately
accountable for outcomes. One way of implementing a dynamic,
outcome-oriented approach to education reform where courts act as
goal-setters but encourage broad-based and highly localized participation
in implementation draws on two areas of environmental law. In the area of
criteria pollutants,366 the Clean Air Act367 combines two distinctive
governmental roles: federal standard-setting and state implementation. The
federal government sets the ends and the states choose the means. First,
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") defines a certain number
of pollutants it wants to control and certain goals for how much of each a
state can have. These goals are called National Ambient Air Quality
Standards ("NAAQS") .368 Every state must submit a state implementation
plan ("SIP") to the EPA outlining its plan for meeting (or exceeding)
these goals.369 It can meet the goals in whatever way it chooses, and the
EPA cannot order a state to choose one feasible plan over another.370 If a
state fails to submit a SIP or submits a SIP that is inadequate, it becomes
subject to sanctions.3 1 After two years, if a state has failed to win EPA
approval for its SIP, the EPA must impose a federal implementation plan
("FIP").37 ' The EPA can also request a SIP revision if an existing plan is
"substantially inadequate to attain or maintain the relevant [NAAQS]" or•373
meet other requirements.
Superimposed on this model is another structure that classifies parts
of the country that continue to exceed the NAAQS as nonattainment
areas and imposes substantial additional conditions on polluting activities
in order to move them into compliance.374 In contrast, areas that have air
quality better than the NAAQS are classified according to a "Prevention
315of Significant Deterioration" program.
366. PM10, PM2.5, S02, CO, NOx, Ozone, and Lead.
367. 42 U.S.C. % 7401-7642 (1994).
368. 42 U.S.C. 7409.
369. 42 U.S.C. 7410.
370. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256-58 (1976) (holding that the EPA
cannot reject a SIP because it is economically or technologically unfeasible).
371. 42 U.S.C. § 7509.
372. 42 U.S.C. 7410(c).
373. 42 U.S.C. 7410(k)(5).
374. 42 U.S.C. 7501-7508.
375. 42 U.S.C. § 7470-7479.
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The analogy is somewhat loose, but this Article proposes a framework
for school finance reform that follows along roughly the same lines with
minor modifications. As discussed above, courts would be the goal-setters,
defining the contours of the constitutional requirement-based on inputs
and outcomes-and monitoring the state legislatures' efforts in meeting
these requirements. After the court has defined the constitutional require-
ment, the ad hoc committee would be convened to lay out the blueprint
for reform. Once the blueprint has been approved by the court, the state
legislature should pass legislation designed to implement the plan.
The ad hoc committee should participate alongside the state
Department of Education to oversee the implementation of the legislative
design. The agency would retain control of the process but would actively
solicit feedback from other members of the committee. Each school district
would look at its individual needs and obstacles and would submit a district
implementation plan annually to the state Department of Education.
From the start of the reform process, school districts should be divided
between attainment areas and non-attainment areas on the basis of whether
a certain percentage of the students are meeting the outcome-based goals
over time.31 6 For the reasons outlined in Sheff, districts with high degrees of
racial segregation should be prima facie considered to be in non-attainment
if the constitutional definition of adequacy includes racial integration. The
state's ability to provide an adequate education to children in non-
attainment areas would be scrutinized more closely than its efforts in his-
torically affluent or high-performing schools-though these schools would
not be allowed to deteriorate significantly.
In "attainment areas," districts would still be required to meet the in-
put minima (i.e., teacher training requirements, maximum class sizes,
adequacy of physical infrastructure, basic instrumentalities of learning, etc.)
and would be required to prevent significant deterioration in outcome
measures.
In "non-attainment" areas, the state legislature and the ad hoc com-
mittee would work closely with the school districts to create a district
implementation plan to meet the outcome-based goals. The same input-
based goals should serve as a floor for the non-attainment districts and the
state would be required to ensure that the funding was available to purchase
these inputs at their local market prices. On top of this input-based floor,
there should be a constitutional requirement that the outcome-based goals
be met within a certain timeframe. A funding structure should be set up to
give non-attainment districts additional assistance in meeting the output-
based goals.This implementation plan should focus on the best judgment of
376. A statistical analysis should be conducted to ensure that a district will not be
called an attainment area if the district only met the goals because extraordinary achieve-
ment by socio-economically privileged groups offset consistent underperformance by less
advantaged groups.
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the school district and the state as to what measures are necessary to meet
the output-based goals.
Above the input-based minima, a wide variety of policy proposals
might be effective in reforming school systems, depending on the needs of
the individual community. As discussed in Part VI infra, complicated prob-
lems often require holistic solutions. Even in non-attainment areas, the
process of reviewing and approving district implementation plans should be
flexible enough to encourage innovation according to local needs.The plan
should be reviewed frequently by state agencies and the ad hoc committee
to ensure that progress is being made towards the goals and that the district
implementation plan is reasonably calculated to meet the goals within a set
period of time.
Persistent underperformance would require increasing scrutiny over
time, and increasing pressure from the state Department of Education and
the ad hoc committee to adopt best practice standards if the initial, locally-
devised approach proves ineffective. If a district consistently fails to meet its
outcome-based goals over a certain time period, the state should have the
first opportunity to correct the deficiency along the lines anticipated in the
blueprint created by the ad hoc committee and approved by the court. Be-
cause of its affirmative constitutional duty, the state legislature would remain
ultimately responsible for providing an adequate education to students in
each district.
After several years of persistent underperformance, if the state's
remedial efforts fail, courts themselves must step in. Parents of students in a
persistently underperforming district should eventually be permitted to sue
the state for an injunction and would have a rebuttable presumption that
the state is failing in its constitutional duty to provide equal educational
opportunities if the district consistently fails to meet the output-based goals.
Under these circumstances, a court should order the state to fulfill its
constitutional obligations. This is a kind of "technology forcing" or strict
liability approach.
Eventually, in extreme circumstances, the court should order the state
to implement the court's own implementation plan or require that the state
take over the school district's administrative functions. If many districts at a
time are in non-attainment, the court might instead order the state
legislature to enact a new comprehensive reform program reasonably
calculated to meet the constitutional mandate statewide.
Furthermore, there should also be a mechanism for revising the
judicially-crafted goals and the blueprint in light of new information, other
states' experiences, or an emerging consensus in the education profession.
377. Cf Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 360, at 120 (arguing that a court
in Texas can use the same information available to parents concerning comparable schools
in order to determine if a particular school district is flaunting the law).
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PARTVI.
ENCOURAGE INNOVATION/HOLISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM
The results of early education reform efforts are sobering. A
collaborative process that leads to investment of new resources into
under-resourced and under-performing schools may not be enough to
lead to dramatic improvements in educational outcomes. Flexibility, a
holistic approach, and an emphasis on the individual needs of each
community are important components of a sound education reform
remedy. In evaluating blueprints presented by the ad hoc committee and
in considering whether district implementation plans are realistically
calculated to lead to adequacy within a set time period, courts should be
flexible enough to encourage other decision-makers to develop
innovative and holistic responses to structural problems.
As Kentucky's experience shows, insisting that the legislature invest
enough money to provide input-based minima is just the beginning.
Money matters, but investing increasing sums into failing schools is not a
panacea.3 78 As the Ohio Supreme Court explained in DeRolph II:
Even if the system were very generously funded, if other
factors are ignored, it might still not be thorough and effi-
cient. If teachers are ill prepared and students are unaware of
what is expected of them, then our state has failed them ....
If students have the most up-to-date textbooks but cannot
comprehend the material in those books, then our state has
failed them.
The trial court in CFE sounded a similar note when it found that:
Fundamentally, spending comparisons cannot erase the facts
... which demonstrate-as measured by the inputs and out-
puts included in the Court of Appeals' template-that New
York City public school students are not receiving a sound
basic education. A sound basic education is gauged by the
resources afforded students and by their performance, not by
the amount of funds provided to schools. The State's recent
increases in school funding can only begin to address long-
standing problems in New York City's public schools ...
Since there has been no fundamental change in the struc-
ture and operation of the State education finance system,
378. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
379. DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Ohio 2000).
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there is no guarantee that recent increases are sufficient or
will be sustained. °
The Appellate Division in CFE accepted the importance of extrinsic
obstacles, but reached a different conclusion. Reasoning that money might
be better spent on eliminating the socio-economic conditions facing
some students,381 Justice Lerner reversed the trial court's opinion rather
than accepting the challenge of structuring a remedy that would provide
meaningful educational opportunity to all students in NewYork. This Ar-
ticle suggests that this narrow a definition of educational "opportunity"
recklessly vitiates the state's constitutional duty to provide a "sound basic
education." Instead, the Court of Appeals should have structured a reme-
dial order that acknowledges the complex and multifaceted nature of the
obstacles facing impoverished students and directs reform efforts towards
factors that are both intrinsic to the school system and extrinsic to it.
On the level of implementation, courts, legislators, and other actors
should be partners in creating a strategy that looks at the problem of un-
der-resourced and under-performing schools in a way that:
(1) acknowledges that certain tangible inputs-that are linked to
money-can make a difference in creating educational options; (2) assists
local school districts in identifying best practice methods to use the new
resources effectively.
382
Equally importantly, courts should encourage reform efforts that:
(3) treat education reform as a project that is inextricably interwoven with
other cultural and socio-economic reform efforts such as family literacy,
early childhood education, and housing reform; and (4) adapt the educa-
tion reform strategy to the needs of an individual community or region.
To the extent that these other problems are ineluctably intertwined with
educational opportunities, courts should look sympathetically at district
implementation plans for non-attainment districts (or blueprints for entire
states) that look beyond K-12 reform in their efforts to provide an ade-
quate education to all students.
A. Thinking Beyond K- 12 Reform
Part of the appeal of education reform is the idea that true educa-
tional opportunity can lead to cyclically-reinforcing results. Even if raised
in poverty, a child who receives a quality education and works diligently
can secure a stable, fulfilling job, housing, health care benefits, and retire-
ment security. She can become a leader in her community, acting as a
380. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 534.
381. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 744 N.YS.2d at 144.
382. See supra note 359.
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representative voice in local politics or the courts. She can offer opportu-
nities for her children to which she herself did not have access as a youth.
Another way to look at education reform is to see it as dependent
upon these other factors. In a country where 20% of children are born
into poverty and 26% percent live with parents who do not have full-
time, year-round employment, 383 education reform may face insuperable
obstacles if it ignores communities and family, health and the environ-
ment, employment and training.
In some cases, reforming schools may require looking beyond the
schools themselves. Education reform litigation has traditionally focused
on schools in abstraction from housing, adult literacy, health care, and em-
ployment rates. Effective reform may require a broader perspective. Courts
can encourage legislatures and other stakeholders to take a more holistic
view of the problem-though it would be appropriate for the courts to
tread lightly in using their equitable powers in school reform litigation to
order changes in non-school policies. By way of illustration only, this Arti-
cle briefly discusses links between education reform and other policy
efforts to advance family literacy, early education, and housing reform.
1. Family Literacy and Early Education Programs
There are approximately ninety million American adults with limited
literacy skills.38 4 Illiteracy correlates strongly with race, ethnicity, and pov-
381erty. In 2000, 43% of adults with the lowest literacy levels lived in
poverty, 17% received food stamps, and 70% had no job or only a part-
time job.386
Illiteracy has strong cyclical qualities. Children who grow up
in households where adults read are more likely to learn to read
themselves.3 7 One explanation for this phenomenon is that when a child
grows up in an environment where literacy skills are not emphasized, the
child is unlikely to develop or value those skills. Additionally, when
education is not valued in the home, children miss out on important early
educational opportunities and consequently start out behind other
children in school.3 9 Family members are important educational
383. See Fast Facts, supra note 14.
384. See supra note 16.
385. Schwartz, Why Johnnys Parents Can't Read, supra note 15, at 189-91.
386. See National Institute for Literacy, Fact Sheet: Adult & Family Literacy, 1, 1 (Apr.
2000), at http://novel.nifl.gov/nifl/policy/famlitfactsheet.doc (last visited Dec. 4, 2002)
[hereinafter Adult & Family Literacy] (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
387. Schwartz, Why Johnny's Parents Can't Read, supra note 15, at 192.
388. Id. at 192-93.
389. Id. at 193.
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390
resources and investment to ensure that these resources are available may
sometimes be as important as other inputs in creating educational
opportunity.
Where adult literacy rates are low,39 1 family literacy programs may be
valuable tools to break the cycles of illiteracy in a community. Programs
that focus on the intergenerational aspects of literacy and treat parents as
the first teachers of children have had a measurable impact on both the
education and the quality of life of children 392 and should be seriously
considered as key components of education reform strategies in commu-
nities where parental education levels are 10w.
393
Likewise, early education programs can help at-risk children enter
public schools better prepared to learn. Recent studies suggest that at-risk
children who are given supplementary pre-kindergarten education
through the Head Start program benefit in terms of their reading and
mathematics skills.394 Increased attention to family literacy and early
childhood education offers great promise as an efficient way to improve
the overall performance of children in poorer communities and to over-
come cyclical disadvantages.
390. YUDOF, EDUCATION POLICY & THE LAW IV, supra note 26, at 775; see also Lawrence
Picus, Student-Level Finance Data: Wave of the Future, 74 THE CLEARING HOUSE, 76-77
(Nov./Dec. 2000).
391. Overall, 22% of children in the United States are born to mothers with less than
twelve years of education. That number rises to 27% among African Americans and 49%
among Latinos. In contrast, only 13% of non-Hispanic Whites are born to mothers with
less than twelve years of education. See Fast Facts, supra note 14.
392. See Adult & Family Literacy, supra note 386.
393. Additionally, family literacy is an area where the federal government can assist
states and municipalities through financial and operational support without unduly threat-
ening local control of K-12 curricula. In 1996-97,637 local projects received 102 million
federal dollars through the Even Start program and served approximately 48,000 children
and 36,000 adults. U.S. Dep't of Educ., Even Start: Evidence from the Past and a Look to the
Future, at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/EvenStart/highlights.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2002)
(on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law). This represents .04% of the ninety
million adults with literacy skills of NALS Level 1 or 2. See supra note 384.
394. See Sharon L. Ramey et al., Administration for Children & Families, U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Services, Head Start Children s Entry into Public School:A Report on the Na-
tional Head Start/Public School Early Childhood Transition Demonstration Study (Nov. 2000), at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/core/pubs-reports/hs/transition-study/trans-study.html
(last visited December 4, 2002) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Race & Law).
Ramey contests the view that the benefits of Head Start "fade out," contending instead
that a vast majority of Head Start children achieve essentially at national averages after two
or three years in public schools (in contrast to lagging skills when they entered kindergar-
ten). Id.
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B. Housing Policy
To the extent that housing patterns perpetuate racial segregation and
unequal school financing systems, 3 ' housing reform may have a power-
ful effect on educational outcomes. Where housing is inadequate or
radically segregated, efforts to target these problems directly may help
provide adequate educational opportunities to young people in the area.9 7
As Justice DeGrasse explained:
There is significant social science research that indicates that
this [racial] isolation has a negative effect on student
achievement. There is also some nascent research that indi-
cates that steps to increase racial and socioeconomic
integration may be more cost effective in raising student
achievement than simply increasing funds allocated to high
percentage minority schools.398
For these reasons, courts should issue education reform remedies that
are flexible enough to permit legislatures and other decision-makers to
approach education reform and housing reform as part of a larger, coordi-
nated poverty-alleviation strategy.
3 9 9
Strong empirical evidence indicates that the poor have become sig-
nificantly more geographically concentrated since 1970400 and that this
concentration is much more pronounced among African Americans and
395. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
396. Cf Quentin A. Palfrey, Recent Legislation: Federal Housing Subsidies, 37 HARv. J. ON
LEGIs. 567, 568 (2000) [hereinafter Palfrey, Federal Housing Subsidies] (arguing that housing
vouchers may be preferable to additional public housing experditures because of their
cost-effectiveness, deconcentration effects, and capacity to overcome spatial mismatch
between where the poor live and where jobs are created, but contending that housing
voucher appropriations should permit supply-side remedies in especially tight labor mar-
kets, provide mechanisms for housing location assistance, coordinate land-use planning
efforts, and be more fully funded to address a national housing crisis).
397. Cf. Ryan, Schools, Race, & Money, supra note 158, at 256 (arguing that "[i]ncreasing
expenditures in racially isolated schools ... cannot replicate the social benefits of racially
integrated schools").
398. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.YS.2d at 551 (citation omitted).
399. Cf Palfrey, Federal Housing Subsidies, supra note 396, at 575-77 (advocating greater
coordination between housing policymakers and anti-sprawl advocates).
400. See Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI-KEr L. REV. 795,
798 (1991) [hereinafter Deconcentrating]; see also Jargowsky & Bane, Ghetto Poverty, supra
note 59, at 253 (arguing that from 1970 to 1980, the number of people with incomes
below the poverty level living in census tracts with over 40% poverty rates increased from
1.9 million to 2.4 million). This trend increased in the period from 1980 to 1986, when
the number of inner city poor people living 20% poverty areas increased from 884,000 to
1,614,000. See Schill, Deconcentrating, supra note 400, at 798.
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Latinos than among non-Hispanic whites. Governmental policy-from
Jim Crow and dejure segregation of schools to more seemingly innocuous
housing policies-have contributed significantly to the concentration of
poverty and the racial and socioeconomic segregation of America.
40 2
Professor William Julius Wilson argues that "social dislocation" in the
form of crime, joblessness, out-of-wedlock births, single motherhood, and
welfare dependency is linked to the changes in the economic-class
structure in inner-city neighborhoods.4 3 In The Truly Disadvantaged,
Professor Wilson argues that the exodus of middle-class African-American
401. See Schill, Deconcentrating, supra note 400, at 799; see also Jargowsky & Bane, Ghetto
Poverty, supra note 400, at 252 (finding in 1980 that 65% of the ghetto poor were African
American, 22% Hispanic, and 13% non-Hispanic White and other races). According to
Professor Wilson, African Americans constituted about 23% of the population of central
cities in 1983, but were 43% of the poor. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DIsADVAN-
TAGED:THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, & PUBLIC POLICY, 33 (1987) [hereinafter Wilson,
TRULY DISADVANTAGED].
402. See Shelby D. Green, The Search for a National Land Use Policy: For the Cities' Sake,
26 Fordham Urb. LJ. 69, 88 n.118, 91 (1998) [hereinafter Green, Search for National Land
Use Policy] (describing the link between federal slum clearance programs and racial segre-
gation). Starting with the Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. 5 1437 et seq. (1994), the federal
government helped increase the stock of affordable housing through the construction of
government-owned public housing.This legislation contained an "equivalent elimination"
provision that required one unit of slum housing to be condemned for every low-income
unit constructed. See id.; see also Green, Search for National Land Use Policy, supra, at 89
n.118. Since the slum housing was located in the inner city, that is where the new con-
struction took place. Furthermore, until the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act
of 1998 loosened the targeting, see Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 (1998), public housing was generally provided exclusively for
the poorest of the poor, with a strong preference for the homeless.While in the short run
this approach appears to be the most vertically equitable, it has undesirable consequences
in terms of "concentrating" the poorest of the poor. Meanwhile, government policy ex-
plicitly and implicitly attracted non-Hispanic Whites to the suburbs and kept minorities
out. Race-specific policies in the Home Owner's Loan Corporation and the Federal
Housing Authority policies contributed to the suburbanization of Whites and the racial
segregation of the United States. It was the Federal Housing Administration's explicit pol-
icy in its Undenvriting Manual that "if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary
that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes." See
MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAs M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PER-
SPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 18 (1995). Furthermore, community opposition made it
hard to buy suburban land. See Green, Searchfor National Land Use Policy, supra, at 91. Re-
strictive zoning provisions and loan forgiveness to mostly White veterans, made it
appealing for Whites to move to the suburbs and almost impossible for poor African
Americans to do so. The Veteran's Administration sought to increase the availability of
private loans for housing by providing mortgage insurance to benefit lenders (including
interest rate ceilings, uniform lending criteria, lower down payments, and longer than
usual terms). They mandated large lots and low density and gave lower appraisal to pre-
dominantly black neighborhoods. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750(g) (1994); see also Green,
Searchfor National Land Use Policy supra, at 85-6.
403. SeeWilson, TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 401, at 49.
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professionals, followed by working-class African Americans, removes an
important "social buffer" that could otherwise deflect the full impact of
prolonged joblessness. 40 4 More economically stable and secure families,
Professor Wilson argues, act as role models that keep alive the perception
"that education is meaningful, that steady employment is a viable
alternative to welfare, and that family stability is the norm, not the
exception.''
4 0 5
Professor Wilson contends that when community leaders depart the
406poorest communities, they leave behind a much higher concentration
of a group that Wilson refers to as the "ghetto underclass. 0 °7 The ensuing
social isolation excludes the "ghetto underclass" from crucial job net-
works. As the prospects for employment diminish, welfare, crime, drug
addiction, and single motherhood come to be seen as ways of life.405 When
children rarely interact with employed role models, the relationship be-
tween school and employment changes and the educational system falls• 409
into a downward spiral of teacher frustration and student indifference.
Concentrated poverty also creates negative externalities that drive busi-
nesses to leave and discourage new businesses from entering the
410
community.
While Professor Wilson gives primary etiological significance to a
structural transformation within the African American community, Doug-
las Massey and Nancy Denton contend that:
[R]acial segregation-and its characteristic institutional
form, the black ghetto-are the key structural factors re-
sponsible for the perpetuation of black poverty in the
United States. Residential segregation is the principal or-
ganizational feature of American society that is responsible
for the creation of the urban underclass.11
Where there is residential segregation, Massey and Denton argue, an
increase in poverty leads to increased geographic concentrations of
404. See id. at 56.
405. See id.
406. Professor Wilson's implicit equation of employed and relatively affluent adults with
community leadership and effective role models may be an oversimplification.
407. See Wilson, TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 401, at 49.
408. See id. at 57.
409. See id.; see also Ryan, Schools, Race, & Money, supra note 158, at 257 (contending
that "peers generally exert a strong influence on student performance and that students
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds in particular suffer from being surrounded solely
or primarily by students from similarly impoverished backgrounds").
410. See Schill, Deconcentrating, supra note 400, at 805.
411. MASSEY & DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID, supra note 40, at 9; see also Jennifer M.
Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit of Individualism in the Making of Social
Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1422-23 (1995).
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poverty, the wholesale withdrawal of commercial institutions,
deterioration of goods and services, and increases in crime, decay, and
social disorder.What remains is an "underclass" defined in large part by its
"oppositional culture" and behavioral norms that hinder upward social
mobility.
1 2
Just as government policy has contributed to the problem of racially
413segregated communities, explicit governmental efforts may be necessary
to reverse the effects racial isolation has on its ability to fulfill its obliga-
tion to provide an adequate education to students in all school districts.
This is not to suggest that courts should lightly use their injunctive power
to order housing reform as a solution to educational segregation in the
absence of de jure segregation of schools. Rather, this Article suggests that
courts should encourage and support innovative solutions by other actors
that view residential segregation and segregated schools as related socio-
economic phenomena.
Professor McUsic suggests a related but distinct way of advancing
some of the same goals through a "class integration" reform strategy. By
preventing the number of low-income students in any one school from
reaching 50%,1' 4 a state could "shift[] the remedy from redistributing
educational resources in the form of dollars to redistributing educational
resources in the form of classmates."
415
Although it might be politically controversial, significant gains could
be accomplished by tinkering with the boundaries of school districts to
pair rich school-districts with poor school-districts. 416 The New Jersey
Supreme Court attempted a similar approach to low-income housing in
the controversial Mount Laurel line of cases4 17 by requiring each municipal-
ity to provide a significant percentage of the low-income housing
required by the surrounding area. Since decreasing reliance on local fund-
412. See MASSEY & DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID, supra note 40, at 9-16; see also
Russell, supra note 411, at 1423.
413. See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
414. McUsic, Law' Role, supra note 12, at 131.
415. Id. at 130; see also supra note 206.
416. McUsic, Laws Role, supra note 12, at 131.
417. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A. 2d 390 (NJ.
1983) (finding that State Development Guide Plan serves as an adequate remedy for viola-
tions of the Mount Laurel doctrine); Burlington County NAACP v.Township of Mount
Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (enjoining municipalities to utilize land use regulations to
provide a realistic opportunity for low- and moderate-income housing); Burlington
County NAACP v.Township of Mount Laurel, 290 A. 2d 465 (N.J. Super. 1972) (holding
that municipal zoning ordinances and budgetary policies exhibited economic discrimina-
tion and deprived the poor of adequate housing and the opportunity to secure
construction of subsidized housing).
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ing may actually lead to absolute declines in school funding, ' 8 increasing
the size of a rich district to increase the number of poor children may be
more effective than shifting funding entirely to the state level. 4 19 One ad-
vantage to this approach is political: state aid for suburban schools might
actually increase to pay them to accommodate more poor children from
the surrounding area.4 20 This fact might mitigate resistance from politically
powerful suburban voters.
C. Tailor the Reform Efforts to the Individual Community or Region
Concentrated poverty, low levels of adult literacy and employment,
and racial segregation are serious impediments to meaningful education
reform, but they are not present to the same extent in all communities
with under-resourced and/or under-performing schools. One of the most
compelling reasons for involving a diverse array of participants in the
process of drafting a blueprint on the statewide level and putting together
a district implementation plan at the local level is that one size does not
fit all.
Different strategies may be required where: (1) a state's schools are
uniformly under-performing and/or under-funded;41 '  and where
(2) wealthy areas are located near poor areas and some schools in the sys-
tem function better than others.4 2 For example, Kentucky and NewYork
present different obstacles-perhaps suggesting that the approach to re-
form should be distinct. Where most of the schools in a state are under-
funded and under-performing, Professor McUsic argues that adequacy-
based reform will be most effective.423 In contrast, where states have con-
centrated poverty surrounded by wealthy areas, she suggests instead that
states should make an effort to deconcentrate poor schools through a
"class integration model" of reform discussed above. 24
418. Retaining significant dependence on local property taxes may be the best strategy
for raising funds for education. Where local property taxes fund education, suburban par-
ents have incentives to vote for school taxes because: (1) there is a direct correlation
between local taxes and the quality of their children's education; and (2) non-parents will
subsidize their education. Suburban non-parents also benefit because good schools increase
property values. Empirical evidence suggests that when funding is shifted to the state level,
it is harder to raise funds for education. McUsic, Laws Role, supra note 12, at 113-14.
419. This approach may also have diminishing (and eventually negative) marginal effec-
tiveness as the district size grows. Cf supra note 418.
420. McUsic, Law' Role, supra note 12, at 132.
421. Id. at 134 (advocating a"whole state reform model" in states like Kentucky).
422. Id. at 128-134 (advocating a "class integration model" in states like New York
where severe poverty is highly concentrated and some schools are sufficiently funded and
perform well).
423. Id. at 134.
424. Id. at 131.
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Likewise, states without much racial diversity do not fit neatly into a
race-conscious model of reform. For example, education reform efforts in
New Hampshire and Vermont may have a much more limited racial ele-
425ment. In determining whether a "blueprint" or district implementation
plan is reasonably calculated to remedy unconstitutionally inadequate
schools, courts should take these regional variations into account and
structure decision-making processes that empower local actors to tailor
their plans to the unique needs of individual communities.
CONCLUSION
The promise of Brown remains unfulfilled. As we begin the twenty-
first century, we are a nation that provides radically unequal resources to
our children in racially and socioeconomically divided schools and com-
munities. The legal regime that underlies these inequalities also holds the
key to reforming our educational system and providing truly equal op-
portunities to the next generation. Despite vigorous and sustained efforts
involving every level of government, the results of education reform since
Brown and Rodriguez have been mixed at best.
While the shift in strategy from equity to adequacy opens up excit-
ing new possibilities for reforming under-performing schools, courts face
daunting challenges when confronted with unconstitutionally inadequate
school systems. Courts that are on the verge of structuring a remedial or-
der should heed and apply the lessons of the past. Kentucky offers a
model for a constructive relationship between courts, legislatures, and
other stakeholders, while the experiences of New Jersey and Ohio sug-
gests some cautionary lessons in this regard. Connecticut's approach
laudably includes race in the definition of adequacy. California's experi-
ence suggests some of the dangers of an over-emphasis on equalization.
Finally, Massachusetts' on-going experiment with high stakes testing may
provide its own lessons with regard to measuring outcomes over time.
Ultimately, however, many of the most valuable lessons have yet to be
learned. The mixed results experienced in states even after dramatic plain-
tiffs' victories suggest that broader structural problems may need to be
addressed in order to provide truly adequate schooling to all children.
Administrative law and environmental law may provide useful mecha-
nisms for structuring a collaborative education reform process that
addresses the needs of individual communities and can ultimately result in
sustained and meaningful reform.
425. Cf Buzuvis, "A"for Effort, supra note 7, at 647 (observing that "because [New
Hampshire and Vermont] are overwhelmingly White and therefore racially homogenous,
the aspect of race-based inequality is largely eliminated from the equation, allowing for the
isolation of economic inequality").
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Equality of educational opportunity is a necessary precondition for
the fulfillment of the American dream.Whatever the approach, remedying
"savage inequalities" and shameful racial segregation of schools belongs at
the forefront of our nation's legal and public policy agenda.

